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[T]he establishment of broadly applicable general principles is an
essential component of the judicial process.
—Justice Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law is A Law of Rules
[T]he highest ethical life of the mind consists at all times in the
breaking of rules which have grown too narrow for the actual case
—William James, Principles of Psychology
Introduction
There are two stylized conceptions of legal judgment. The first,
associated with Jeremy Bentham and more recently with Justices
Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia, places a high premium on the
creation and application of general rules. On this view, public au-
thorities should avoid “balancing tests” or close attention to individ-
ual circumstances. They should attempt instead to give guidance to
lower courts, future legislators, and citizens through clear, abstract
rules laid down in advance of actual applications. The second con-
ception, associated with Blackstone and more recently with Justices
Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan, places a high premium
on law-making at the point of application through case-by-case de-
cisions, narrowly tailored to the particulars of individual circum-
stances. On this view, public authorities should stay close to the de-
tails of the controversy before them, and avoid broader principles al-
together. The problem with broad principles is that they tend to
overreach; they may be erroneous or unreasonable as applied to cases
not before the court.
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It would not be easy to overstate the importance of the contro-
versy between the two views. Such issues arise in every area of law;
they often involve fundamental liberties. Of course familiar under-
standings of the rule of law prize, as a safeguard of freedom, broad
rules laid down in advance; but the American legal system also values
close attention to the details of each case. In every area of regula-
tion—the environment, occupational safety and health, energy pol-
icy, communications, control of monopoly power—it is necessary to
choose between general rules and case-by-case decisions.
In its purest form, enthusiasm for genuinely case-specific deci-
sions is incoherent. Few if any judgments about a particular case are
entirely particular. Almost any judgment about a particular case de-
pends on the use of principles, or reasons. Any principles or reasons
are, by their very nature, broader than the case for which they are
designed. Case-by-case particularism is not a promising foundation
for law.
In many circumstances, however, enthusiasm for rules seems
senseless. Sometimes public authorities cannot design general rules,
because they lack relevant information. Sometimes general rules will
fail, because the legal system seeks subtle judgments about a range of
particulars. Often general rules will be poorly suited to the new cir-
cumstances that will be turned up by unanticipated developments.
Often rulemakers cannot foresee the circumstances to which their
rules will be applied. Often rules will be too crude, since they run up
against intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be re-
solved. In short, the costs of making rules, and of adhering to rules,
are often extremely high.
One of my principal goals in this essay is to respond to a perva-
sive social phenomenon: extravagant enthusiasm for rules and the
rule of law. Case-by-case decisions are an important part of legal
justice. At the same time, we should keep in mind the characteristic
vices of rulelessness, which include bias, unequal treatment, and
high costs. Particularism is even worse than a mixed blessing for law;
it is an invitation to error and abuse.
As a way of reducing the risks of both rules and case-by-case
judgments, I suggest two principal alternatives. The first is prag-
matic. It involves a highly contextualized inquiry into the levels and
kinds of error and injustice via rules or via rulelessness. Surprising
progress can be made through such inquiries. Rules cannot be fa-
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vored or disfavored in the abstract; everything depends on whether,
in context, rules are superior to the alternatives. The second involves
a presumption in favor of what I will call privately adaptable
rules—rules that allocate initial entitlements but do not specify end-
states, and that harness private forces to determine outcomes.
Privately adaptable rules are typically invoked in support of economic
markets. I argue here that they also deserve an honored place in a
legal system committed to a wide range of corrections to the
operation of economic markets.
I. Sources of Law
Law has a toolbox, containing many devices. Lawyers have cus-
tomarily opposed rules (“do not go over 60 miles per hour”) to stan-
dards (“do not drive unreasonably fast”), with rules seeming hard and
fast, and standards seeming open-ended. There is indeed a differ-
ence between rules and standards. But the rules-standards debate
captures only a part of what is at stake, and it is important to have a
fuller sense of the repertoire of available devices. In this section I
outline a number of them; my goal is only to clarify some terms that
will come up throughout.
First, however, a cautionary note. It will be apparent that
whether a legal provision is a rule, a presumption, a principle, a stan-
dard, a set of factors—or something else—cannot be decided in the
abstract. Everything depends on the understandings and practices of
the people who interpret the provision. The American
Constitution, for example, says that “Congress shall make no law
abridging the freedom of speech.” This provision might operate as a
rule if people take it as a flat ban on certain sorts of regulations. It
could operate as a presumption if people see it as saying that
Congress can regulate speech only if it makes a demonstration of
harm of certain kinds and degrees. Or it could be a set of factors;
once we parse notions like “abridging” and “the freedom of speech,”
perhaps we will decide cases on the basis of an inquiry into two,
three, or more relevant considerations. The content and nature of a
legal provision cannot be read off the provision. It is necessary to see
what people take it to be.
For this reason we should distinguish among three kinds of ac-
tors. The first is the person or institution that issues the relevant le-
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gal provision. The second is the person or institution that is subject
to the provision. The third is the person or institution charged with
the power to interpret the provision. If we take a rule to be a provi-
sion that minimizes law-making power in particular cases (see be-
low), a lawmaker may intend to issue a rule, but the interpretive
practices of the interpreting institution may turn the provision into
something very different. Whether a provision is a rule or not is a
function of interpretive practices, and the lawmaker has limited
power over those practices.
A. Untrammeled Discretion
By “untrammeled discretion,” I mean the capacity to exercise of-
ficial power as one chooses, by reference to such considerations as
one wants to consider, weighted as one wants to weight them. A
legal system cannot avoid some degree of discretion, in the form of
power to choose according to one’s moral or political lights. As we
will see, the interpretation of seemingly rigid rules itself allows for
discretion. But a legal system can certainly make choices about how
much discretion it wants various people to have.
A system of untrammeled discretion exists when there are no
limits on what officials may consider in reaching a decision and on
how much weight various considerations deserve; hence there are no
limits on the officials’ power to decide what to do. Both inputs and
outputs are unconstrained. In the real world, untrammeled discre-
tion is quite rare. But perhaps some police officers come very close to
this sort of authority, in light of the practical unavailability of review.
As we will soon see, it is too simple to oppose rules to discretion.
The basic problem with this opposition is that interpretation of rules
involves discretion, and that so-called discretion is rarely untram-
meled in the legal context.
B. Rules
Often a system of rules is thought to be the polar opposite of a
system of untrammeled discretion. In fact there is no such polar op-
position. Rules do not eliminate discretion. There is a continuum
from rules to untrammeled discretion, with factors and standards
(see below) falling in between.
The key characteristic of rules is that they specify outcomes be-
fore particular cases arise. Rules are defined by the ex ante character
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of law. By a system of rules, I therefore mean to refer to something
very simple: approaches to law that make most or nearly all legal
judgments under the governing legal provision in advance of actual
cases.1 We have rules, or (better) rule-ness, to the extent that the
content of the law has been set down in advance of applications of
the law. In the extreme case, all of the content of the law is given
before cases arise. This is an ambitious goal—impossibly ambitious.
As we will see, no approach to law is likely to avoid allowing at least
some legal judgments to be made in the context of deciding actual
cases. Rules do not and indeed cannot contain all of the necessary
instructions for their own interpretation. Nonetheless, it is possible
to ensure that a wide range of judgments about particular cases will
occur in advance.
On this view, a system of rules exists to the extent that most or
all of the real work of deciding cases and giving content to the law
has been done before the actual applications. We have a rule, or rule-
ness, to the extent that decisions about cases have been made ex ante
rather than ex post. If a key function of law is to assign entitle-
ments, a rule can thus be defined as the full or nearly full ex ante as-
signment of legal entitlements, or the complete or nearly complete ex ante
specification of legal outcomes.
When a rule is in play, the decision of cases does not depend on
ex post assignments—as it does when, for example, a judge decides
whether someone is liable for nuisance by seeing whether his con-
duct was “unreasonable” (assuming this term has not been given
precise content in advance) or when a judge decides whether a re-
striction on abortion imposes an “undue burden” (making the same
assumption). In the purest case, the responsibility of the decision-
maker is to find only the facts; the law need not be found. When
rules are operating, an assessment of facts, combined with an ordi-
nary understanding of grammar, semantics, and diction—and with
more substantive understandings on which there is no dispute—is
usually sufficient to decide the case.
Rules may be simple or complex. A law could say, for example,
that no one under eighteen may drive. It could be somewhat more
complex, saying that people under eighteen may not drive unless
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they pass certain special tests. Or it could be quite complex, creating
a formula for deciding who may drive. It might look, for example, to
age; performance on a written examination; and performance on a
driving test. Each of these three variables might be given a specified
numerical weight.
Rules can also be specific or abstract. Specific rules apply to a
narrow class of cases; abstract rules apply to a broad class of cases. An
abstract rule might say, for example, that no one may drive over 60
miles per hour, or that all cars must be equipped with catalytic con-
verters. A specific rule might say that President Nixon’s papers are
public property; that the first amendment allows government to ban
advertisements for casino gambling when gambling has been
unlawful in the recent past; or that sixth-grade students may be
suspended without a hearing for a period of less than two weeks, if
there has been a serious allegation of criminal activity. All rules are
defined in terms of classes, but sometimes the rule is narrowly
tailored so as to pick up only a few cases, or perhaps only one.
C. Rules With Excuses: Necessity or Emergency Defenses
It is familiar to find rules that have explicit or implicit exceptions
for cases of necessity or emergency. It is unfamiliar, indeed nearly
impossible, to find rules without any such exceptions. For example, a
person may be banned from taking the life of another; this is a rule;
but self-defense is a valid excuse. Many constitutions allow abridge-
ments of individual rights in case of emergency. The American
Constitution allows the President to suspend the writ of habeas cor-
pus in time of war. Other constitutions say that certain rights can be
abridged under unusual circumstances. We might go so far as to say
that almost all rules have at least some implicit exceptions.
The consequences of making exceptions depend on the details.
An exception could be narrow but vague, as in the idea that reason-
able limits on free speech can be made under conditions of war. The
conditions are rare and the exception therefore narrow; but the
meaning of the exception is vague (what are “reasonable limits?”).
Or the exception could be narrow and specific, as in the idea that
under conditions of war, members of the Communist party may not
work for the government in any capacity. An exception might be
broad and vague or broad and specific. A specific exception might
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well convert the rule with exceptions into a complex rule, or a for-
mula.
D. Presumptions
A legal system may contain presumptions or presumptive rules.
The law may presume, for example, that when the government
regulates speech on the basis of its content, the regulation is un-
constitutional. But the presumption might be rebutted by claims of a
certain kind and strength, as when government can show a clear
and present danger. The law might presume that an employer may
not discriminate on the basis of race; but the presumption might be
rebutted by a showing that, for example, a black actor is necessary to
play the part of Othello.
The legal system is pervaded by rules that operate as presump-
tions and that can be countered by showings of a particular kind and
a particular degree. The line between presumptions and rules with
emergency exceptions is thin. A rule with necessity or emergency ex-
ceptions might be described, somewhat imprecisely, as a strong pre-
sumption. With presumptions, it is necessary to know what counts
as a rebuttal, and whether the presumption and the rebuttal are
specific or vague, broad or narrow.
E. Factors
We might contrast both untrammeled discretion and rule-
bound ways of proceeding with approaches that allow particular
judgments to emerge through the decisionmaker’s assessment and
weighing of a number of relevant factors, whose precise content has not
been specified in advance. The key point is that several factors are
pertinent to the decision, but there is no rule, simple or complex, to
apply. There is no rule because the factors are not described exhaus-
tively and precisely in advance, and because their weight has not
been fully specified. Hence the decisionmaker cannot rely simply on
“finding the facts” and “applying the law.” The content of the law is
not given; part of it must be found. There is a degree of ex post allo-
cation of legal entitlements.
On this score, the difference between rules and factors is one of
degree rather than kind. As we will see, those who interpret rules
must determine at least some of their content. In a system of factors,
moreover, the decisionmaker cannot do whatever she wants. But the
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content of the law is created in large part by those who must apply it
to particular cases, and not by people who laid it down in advance.
To a considerable extent, we do not know what the law is until the
assessment of particular cases.
Consider the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
which regulated pricing and allocation of petroleum products from
1973 to 1981. The statute required the agency to “provide for” nine
factors, “to the maximum extent practicable.” These factors were
“protection of public health, safety, and welfare; (2) maintenance of
all public services; (3) maintenance of agricultural operations; (4)
preservation of an economically sound and competitive petroleum
industry; (5) operation of all refineries at full capacity; (6) equitable
distribution of crude oil and petroleum products; (7) maintenance of
exploration and production of fuels; (8) economic efficiency; and (9)
minimization of interference with market mechanisms.”2 Congress
added that each of the nine factors is equally important. There is
much to be said about this quite bizarre list. What is important here
is that an explicit enumeration of factors may be possible.
In most contexts, however, any given list of relevant factors is
not exhaustive. Life may turn up other relevant factors that are hard
or impossible to identify in advance. In most areas of law governed
by factors rather than rules, it is understood that the identified fac-
tors, if described at a level of specificity, are not complete—or that if
they are intended to be complete, they are stated in a sufficiently
general way, so as to allow unanticipated, additional considerations
to apply.
F. Standards
Rules are often compared with standards.3 A ban on “excessive”
speeds on the highway is familiarly thought to involve a standard; so
too with a requirement that pilots be “competent,” or that behavior
in the classroom be “reasonable.” As standards, these might be com-
pared with a 55 miles per hour speed limit, or a ban on pilots who are
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over the age of 70, or a requirement that students sit in particular,
assigned seats.
The contrast between rules and standards is very useful. It iden-
tifies the fact that with some legal provisions, interpreters have to do
a great deal of work in order to generate the necessary content.
With a standard, it is not possible to know what we have in ad-
vance. The meaning of a standard depends on what happens with
its applications. The important feature of standards is that they share
with factors a refusal to specify outcomes in advance. Standards de-
part from factors in refusing to specify the sorts of considerations
that are relevant in particular applications. It would not be right,
however, to say that standards offer more discretion than factors.
The amount of discretion depends on the context.
Here too, moreover, the nature of the provision cannot be read
off its text, and everything will depend on interpretive practices.
Once we define the term “excessive,” we may well end up with a
rule. Perhaps officials will decide that a speed is excessive whenever it
is over 60 miles per hour. If a standard is transparent, in the sense
that there is a clear ex ante understanding of its meaning, it is a rule.
Or we may instead end up with a set of factors or a presumption.
Perhaps anyone who goes over 60 miles per hour will be presumed
to have gone excessively fast, unless special circumstances can be
shown. Or perhaps the judgment about excessive speed will be based
on need, weather conditions, traffic, time of day, and so forth. The
principal distinction between rules and standards turns on the fact
that we do not know what a standard is, or means, until it is ap-
plied.4 Something of the same kind can be said of rules (see below),
but it cannot be said nearly so bluntly.
G. Principles
In law, principles are often said to be both deeper and more
general than rules. We might say that rules are justified by principles.
The justification of the rule could be used to interpret its meaning;
hence courts will resort to the principle in trying to understood the
rule. For example, there is a principle to the effect that it is wrong to
take human life without sufficient cause; the law implements this
principle with a range of rules governing homicide. There is a prin-
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ciple to the effect that it is wrong not to keep your promises; hence
the law contains a range of rules for enforcement of contractual
obligations. A common use of the term “principle” in law involves
the justifications behind rules.
There is another and quite different understanding of the no-
tion of principle in law. Any legal system contains explicitly formu-
lated principles as well as rules; these principles do not lie behind
rules but instead bear on the resolution of cases. Thus it is said that
no person may profit from his own wrong; that he who seeks equity
must do equity; that ambiguous statutes should be construed so as
not to apply outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.
The status of legal principles is somewhat mysterious; they differ in
weight, ranging from strong presumptions to tie-breakers when
cases are otherwise in equipoise. Usually they operate as factors. But
principles are not rules. We might say that principles are more flexi-
ble than rules, in the sense that principles bear on cases without dis-
posing of them. The distinction should not be overstated. Since any
given rule X is unlikely to resolve all cases that fall under the literal
language of rule X, the difference between rules and principles is one
of degree rather than of kind.
What is the relationship between a principle and a standard? If
we see a principle as the justification for a rule, the difference seems
obvious: a standard is not a justification for an (already specified)
rule, but instead a legal provision that needs a good deal of specifica-
tion to be used to resolve individual cases. If we understand a princi-
ple as a relevant consideration in the decision of cases, the distinc-
tion between principles and standards is more complex. As I under-
stand it here, a legal principle is different from a legal standard in the
sense that the latter “covers” individual cases without specifying the
content of the analysis in particular cases, whereas a principle is a
background notion that does not by itself cover an individual case,
but is instead brought to bear on it. This is a lamentably vague for-
mulation. But the distinction makes intuitive sense. Compare a
standard banning unreasonable risks with a principle to the effect
that statutes should be construed so as to avoid constitutional doubts.
One final complication. It is sometimes said that a decision in a
case turns on a “principle,” as in the idea that speech may not be re-
stricted unless there is a clear and present danger, or that discrimina-
tion on the basis of race is presumed invalid, or that no contract is
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valid without consideration. In this usage, a principle is not distin-
guishable from a standard, and at some points below, I will use the
terms interchangeably.
H. Analogies
The last category is not a simple alternative to the others.
Sometimes a legal system proceeds by comparing the case at hand to
a case (or to cases) that have come before. The prior case is inspected
to see whether it “controls,” or should be extended to, the case at
hand. The prior case will be accompanied by an opinion, which may
contain a rule, a standard, a set of factors, or something else. The
court deciding the present case will inspect relevant similarities and
differences. That court, not bound by the previous opinion, may
produce a rule, a standard, a set of factors, or something else. With
analogy, we do not have a decision by rule, because the rule is not
specified in advance of the process of analogical thinking. The rule
emerges from comparison of cases, and it is applied only after it has
been specified. Analogical thinking is rule-based (or standard-based)
only in the sense that it depends on a rule (or a standard); but ana-
logical thinking does not involve simple rule-application (or stan-
dard-application) because the rule (or the standard) is not given in
advance. Analogical reasoning is thus not a form of rule-application.
When courts proceed with analogies, then, the nature of the le-
gal provision—its content and even its character as a rule, a standard,
a set of factors—is not known before the analogical process takes
place. The nature of the provision is specified in the case at hand by
grappling with the precedent; we do not know what we have before
the grappling occurs. It is unusual, however, for analogical thinking
to yield rules. Most of the time, an analogy will produce a standard,
one that makes sense of the outcomes in the case at hand and the
case that came before.
II. Rules and the Rule of Law
A system of rules is often thought to be the signal virtue of a
system of law. Indeed, the rule of law seems to require a system of
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rules.5 The idea has a constitutional source. The due process clause
of the American Constitution is sometimes interpreted so as to re-
quire rules, or rule-like provisions, and to forbid a system based on
analogies, standards, or factors. This is particularly important in the
area of criminal justice and freedom of speech, where the “void for
vagueness” doctrine requires clear rules before the state may regulate
private conduct.
It is not an overstatement to say that the void for vagueness
doctrine is among the most important guarantees of liberty under
law. Consider Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,6 which is exem-
plary on the point.
In the early 1970s, it was a crime to engage in “vagrancy” in the
City of Jacksonville. The category of “vagrancy” covered “Rogues and
vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common
gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers . . . persons wandering
or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or
object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons . . . persons able to work
but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor chil-
dren . . . .” A number of people were arrested under this law. Among
them were two white women, Papachristou and Calloway, who had
been traveling in a car with two black men, Melton and Johnson.
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions on the theory that
the Jacksonville ordinance was inconsistent with the due process
clause. It was “void for vagueness,” because it failed to provide fair
notice that contemplated conduct is unlawful, and because “it en-
courages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions.” The Court
emphasized several points: “The poor among us, the minorities, the
average householder are not in business and not alerted to the regu-
latory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume that they would
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read
them.” Moreover, the “ordinance makes criminal activities that by
modern standards are normally innocent.” Thus “[p]ersons
‘wandering or strolling’ from place to place have been extolled by
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Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay. . . . The difficulty is that these
activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have
known them.”
The ordinance was also unlawful because it put “unfettered
discretion . . . in the hands of the Jacksonville police.” To say this is
not to deny that the ordinance could serve important law enforce-
ment purposes. The Court said: “Of course, vagrancy statutes are
useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the round-
up of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and
justice in its application.”
Notably, the Court quoted a law review article to the effect that
“‘Algeria is rejecting the flexibility introduced in the Soviet criminal
code by the ‘analogy’ principle, as have the East-Central European
and black African states.” Many systems of criminal justice have
made it an offense to engage in conduct that is “analogous” to what
is specifically prohibited. The analogical principle has played a large
role in Chinese criminal law.7 Apparently the Supreme Court be-
lieved that this analogical approach to the criminal law8 raises severe
questions under the due process clause.
We can take Papachristou to exemplify a failure of the rule of
law. But what specifically does this concept entail? We can identify
several characteristics.9  
a. Clear, general, publicly accessible rules laid down in advance.
It is plain that the rule of law requires rules that are clear, in the
sense that people need not guess about their meaning, and that are
general, in the sense that they apply to classes rather than particular
people or groups. Laws should be publicly accessible as well. It fol-
lows that there is a ban on “secret law.” Legal proscriptions must be
available to the public. Of course vague laws—banning, for example,
excessive or unreasonable behavior—are unacceptable, at least in the
criminal context; they are akin to “secret law” in the sense that peo-
ple cannot know what, specifically, they entail. The idea that law
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should be laid down in advance is associated with the notion that
rules, to qualify as such, must specify outcomes before the point of
application. When rules are operating, people who interpret or apply
the law do not give content to the law in the encounter with par-
ticular problems.
In the real world of law, many complexities arise on these
counts. It is a fiction to say that would-be criminals actually consult
the law in advance of the crime. In fact we do not know the extent
to which criminal statutes are understood by the general public.
Undoubtedly the answer varies from area to area, and in many cases
people could not describe the law with much accuracy. It is also the
case that many laws, including criminal statutes, have a high degree
of ambiguity. No legal system is without a large degree of discretion
to give content to law at points of application, and this means that
ruleness will be limited even in legal systems highly committed to
the rule of law. Perhaps this is a failure of the rule of law, but it also
seems to be a product of the limitations of human language and
foresight.
b. Prospectivity; no retroactivity.
In a system of rules, retroactive lawmaking is disfavored, and it is
banned altogether in the context of criminal prohibitions. In gen-
eral, laws must operate prospectively only. The ban on ex post facto
laws is the clearest prohibition on retroactivity. More modestly,
American law includes an interpretive principle to the effect that
civil laws will ordinarily apply prospectively. If the legislature wants
to apply a law retroactively, it must do so unambiguously, and if it
does so unambiguously, there is at least a question to be raised under
the due process clause.
c. Conformity between law on the books and law in the world.
If the law does not operate in the books as it does in the world,
the rule of law is compromised. If there is little or no resemblance
between enacted law and real law, the rule of law cannot exist. If
the real law is different from the enacted law, generality, clarity,
predictability, fair notice, and public accessibility are all sacrificed.
People must be permitted to monitor official conduct by testing it
against enacted law.
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In many legal systems, of course, there is an occasional split be-
tween what the law says and what the law is, and often the split is
severe. But the frequency of the phenomenon should not deflect
attention from the fact that this is a failure of the rule of law.
d. Hearing rights and availability of review by independent ad-
judicative officials.
The rule of law requires a right to a hearing in which people can
contest the government’s claim that the relevant conduct meets legal
requirements for either the imposition of harm or the denial of
benefits. Someone who is alleged to have committed a crime, or to
have forfeited rights to social security benefits or a driver’s license, is
entitled to some forum in which he can claim that the legal stan-
dards have not in fact been violated. Ordinarily the purpose of the
hearing is to ensure that the facts have been accurately found. There
should also be some form of review by independent officials, usually
judges entitled to a degree of independence from political pressures.
e. Separation between law-making and law-implementation.
Legal systems committed to the rule of law separate the task of
making the law from the task of implementing the law. For exam-
ple, the nondelegation principle requires that the legislature lay
down rules in advance; it therefore prohibits rules from being created
by the people who execute them. The nondelegation principle is
now honored much more in the breach than in the observance, in
part because there are no clear criteria by which to distinguish law-
making from law-implementation. The distinction is one of degree
rather than kind. But in some areas of law, people engaged in en-
forcement activity are constitutionally constrained from giving con-
tent to the law. The area of criminal justice is an important example.
f. No rapid changes in the content of law; no contradictions or in-
consistency in the law.
If the law changes too quickly, the rule of law cannot exist.
People will not be able to adapt their conduct to what is required. So
too if the law contains inconsistency or contradiction, which can
make it hard or impossible to know what the rules are. Needless to
say, people should not be placed under mutually incompatible obli-
gations. The problem of rapidly changing law was a prime impetus
behind the adoption of the American Constitution. Hence
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Madison wrote: “The mutability of the laws of the States is found to
be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so
flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I
am persuaded that I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from
these sources contributed more to the uneasiness which produced
the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform,
than those which accrued to our national character and interest
from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate ob-
jects.”10
Both of these phenomena—unstable law and inconsistent
law—are part of the fabric of the modern regulatory state.
Sometimes regulatory law changes very quickly, thus making it
difficult for people to plan. Sometimes regulatory law imposes
conflicting obligations, so that it is hard for people to know what
they are supposed to do. These are important pathologies of modern
law, and they produce high levels of inefficiency and injustice.
g. Likelihood of agreement on meaning of rules from people who dis-
agree on first principles.
A particular advantage of a system of rules is that people who
disagree on much else may nonetheless agree about the meaning of a
rule. A law that forbids people from going over 55 miles per hour has
the same meaning to Republicans and Democrats, libertarians and
socialists, anarchists and members of the Ku Klux Klan. When the
rule of law is in place, people can know what the rules are without
adverting to first principles. Indeed, adverting to first principles is
generally illegitimate, short of civil disobedience. By their very na-
ture, rules ban people from basing their decisions on considerations
that are perfectly legitimate in other settings.
This is an oversimplification, as we will see. Disagreements
about first principles may break out in disputes over the meaning of
rules. But the oversimplification has fundamental truth. And in this
oversimplification also lies some of the enduring truth of legal posi-
tivism, the law-politics distinction, and the view that ours is a gov-
ernment of law, not human beings.
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III. The Case for Rules
A great virtue of rules is that they circumscribe permissible
grounds for both action and argument; in doing so, they reduce
costs of many diverse kinds. I have said that in a heterogeneous so-
ciety, containing people of limited time and capacities, this is an
enormous advantage. It saves a great deal of effort, time, and ex-
pense. But by truncating the sorts of value-disputes that can arise in
law, it also ensures that disagreements will occur along a narrowly
restricted range.
A. Different Kinds of Rules
I now discuss some of the characteristic virtues of decisions ac-
cording to rules. First, however, it is important to note that rules fall
in several different categories. Here is a nonexhaustive account, tied
to my special concerns here.
1. Often rules are a summary of wise decisions; they are defended
on the grounds that they are a good summary, and that they are
desirable as rules, rather than mere advice or rules of thumb, so as to
save the costs of making individualized decisions. Of course a rule
that counts as a summary of wise decisions may operate, for good
pragmatic reasons, as a genuine rule—one that cannot be revisited
during particular applications. If people over the age of sixty are
banned from being commercial pilots, it is because this is a pretty ac-
curate summary of good individual decisions, and less costly to ad-
minister than any alternative. (Consider the expenditures that would
be required to assess competence in every case.) If we say that people
with sat scores below 500 will not be admitted to a certain college,
it is for a similar reason.
2. Often rules establish conventions or otherwise enable people to
coordinate their behavior so as to overcome collective action prob-
lems. This is true, for example, with respect to rules of the road. The
rule that people must drive on the left-hand side of the road is valu-
able because it tells people where to drive, not because it is any better
than its opposite. We do not think that people must drive on the
left because it is a wise decision, in the individual case unaccompa-
nied by rules, to drive on the left. So too, rules may solve prisoner’s
dilemmas, in which individually rational decisions can lead to social
irrationality or even disaster. The rules governing emission of pollu-
18 Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics
tants are an example. And if each polluter felt free to revisit the
justification for the rule, the prisoner’s dilemma might not be solved.
The best solution is probably to fix a rule and to require everyone to
adhere to it.
3. Some rules have an expressive function. The rules governing
who may marry whom, for example, say something about the insti-
tution of marriage and about social convictions of who is entitled to
public recognition of a relational commitment. Three people cannot
be married, nor can people of the same sex. These rules do not
summarize individually wise decisions, but instead express a social
judgment about relations and valuations. We might say that the ex-
pressive function of law includes the effects of law on social attitudes
about relationships, events, and prospects, and also the “statement”
that law makes independently of such effects.
4. Some rules overcome the problem of time inconsistency.
Suppose that in order to succeed in your plans, you need to engage
in consistent behavior over time. Perhaps an exercise program re-
quires you to work out for one hour, and just one hour, every day; or
perhaps a good diet requires you to eat the same things, more or less,
at the same time for a period. In these circumstances, a rule that is
enforceable through some mechanism—perhaps social
sanctions—may be the best way to proceed.
Societies can face similar problems. Perhaps good monetary pol-
icy for a certain period requires the Federal Reserve Board to do the
same thing each month; suppose too that without a rule, and with
particularized consideration of what to do each month, the Board
would do inconsistent things. Adoption of a rule may ensure the
requisite consistency. In this way, a rule may be a precommitment
strategy that overcomes predictable problems with ruleless decisions.
B. Defending Rules As Rules
Rules might produce incompletely theorized agreements—agree-
ments among people who disagree on questions of theory or on
fundamental values. Rules might do this in three different ways.
First, people can agree that a rule is binding, or authoritative, with-
out agreeing on a theory of why it is binding, and without agreeing
that the rule is good. Theories of legitimate authority are highly
pluralistic, and acceptance of rules can proceed from diverse founda-
tions.
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Second, people can often converge on a rule without taking a
stand on large issues of the right or the good. Acceptance of prece-
dents is a familiar practice. So too, people can urge a 60 miles per
hour speed limit, a prohibition on bringing elephants into restau-
rants, a ten-year minimum sentence for attempted rape, and much
more without taking a stand on debates between Kantians and utili-
tarians, and indeed without offering much in the way of general
theory at all. Of course acceptance of any legal provision requires a
reason or a principle; my point is only that a wide range of starting
points can yield the same rule and even the same reason or principle,
so long as these are described at a low or intermediate level of gen-
erality. When legislatures and bureaucracies issue rules, they can
usually do so without getting into high-level theory.
Third, rules sharply diminish the level of disagreement among
people who are subject to them, and among people who must in-
terpret and apply them. When rules are in place, theories need not
be invoked in order for us to know what rules mean, and whether
they are binding. This generalization is a bit crude; but it is funda-
mentally right. In this section, I am concerned principally with the
advantages of rules for those who must follow, enforce, and inter-
pret the law.
1. Rules minimize the informational and political costs of reaching
decisions in particular cases.
If we understand rules to be complete or nearly complete ex ante
specifications of outcomes in particular cases, we can readily see that
rules have extraordinary virtues. Without rules, decisions are ex-
tremely expensive; rules can produce enormous efficiency gains.
Every day we operate as we do because of rules, legal and nonlegal,
and often the rules are so internalized that they become second-na-
ture, greatly easing the costs of decisions and making it possible to
devote our attention to other matters.
Rules are disabling for just this reason; but they are enabling too.
Like the rules of grammar, they help make social life possible. If we
know that there will be one and only one President, we do not have
to decide how many presidents there will be. If we know that a will
must have two witnesses, we do not have to decide, in each case,
how many witnesses there must be to a will. It thus emerges that
rules both free up time for other matters and facilitate private and
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public decisions by establishing the frameworks within which they
can be made.
By adopting rules, people can also overcome their own myopia,
weakness of will, confusion, venality, or bias in individual cases.
Rules make it unnecessary for each of us to investigate to examine
fundamental issues in every instance (and in that now-familiar way
they can create a convergence on particular outcomes by people who
disagree on basic matters). Rules can, in short, be the most efficient
way to proceed, by saving time and effort, and by reducing the risk
of error in particular cases. This holds true for individuals and soci-
eties alike. Societies and their representatives too may be subject to
myopia, weakness of will, confusion, venality, or bias, and rules safe-
guard against all of these problems.
These ideas justify the general idea that rules should be en-
trenched in the sense that they apply even if their rationale does not.
Recall two related points: A rule is not really a rule if decision-
makers feel free to disregard it if its application is not supported by its
justification; and if decision-makers investigate the grounds for rules
before applying them, they convert rules into something very close
to standards or factors. There is much to be said on behalf of refus-
ing to inquire into the grounds for rules. If we substitute for rules an
investigation of whether their justification makes sense in each in-
stance, we are engaging in a form of case-by-case decisionmaking,
and it is easy to underestimate the often enormous costs of that way
of proceeding. Officials may be pressed by the exigencies of a
particular case to seek individualized justice, without seeing the
enormous expense, and risk of unfairness, of that goal.
Some of the costs of rulelessness are simply a matter of compil-
ing information. To know whether a particular pilot is able to fly
competently, we need to know a lot of details. But some of the costs
are of a different character. Suppose that we are deciding on emis-
sions levels for substances that contribute to destruction of the ozone
layer, or that we are thinking about when to go forward with pro-
jects that threaten endangered species. Information is important
here, but it is also necessary for multiple people to reach closure on
hard and even tragic matters. For this reason, there may be high
costs or great difficulty in producing a rule; proceeding through fac-
tors may involve lower cost ex ante. But once a rule is set forth, in-
dividual officials can bracket those matters and take the decision as a
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given. An advantage of having a rule is that those who must inter-
pret rules need not make difficult judgments about first principles.
They can take those judgments as given, at least for the most part.
The high costs—informational and political—of ruleless deci-
sions are often not visible to those who are deciding whether to lay
down rules in the first instance. The Supreme Court, for example,
can see that rules will bind its members, perhaps unfortunately, in
subsequent cases, and therefore might avoid rule-making in the in-
terest of maintaining flexibility for the future. The Court might so
decide without easily seeing that the absence of rules will force liti-
gants and lower courts to guess, possibly for a generation or more,
about the real content of the law. In this way the Court can inter-
nalize the benefits of flexibility while “exporting” to others the costs
of rulelessness. So too, legislatures can see that rules may contain
major mistakes, or that they cannot be compiled without large in-
formational and political costs—without, perhaps, fully understand-
ing that the absence of rules will force administrative agencies and
private citizens to devote enormous effort to giving the law some
concrete content.
Thus far I have emphasized the benefits of rules to legal institu-
tions. But a particular advantage of rules, connected with the infor-
mational cost of rulelessness, is that they enable individuals to align
their conduct accordingly, and thus to plan without fear of sanc-
tions. Rules can therefore provide strong incentives for people to
bring their behavior into compliance. While many of the various
costs of rulelessness must be borne by public officials, who must give
content to the law in particular cases, high costs can be borne by
citizens and corporations as well. People will be unable to plan; they
will also have to invest large amounts of resources in trying to predict
outcomes and to persuade people that the balance of factors favors
them in particular cases. For all these reasons, a good justification for
insisting on rules involves the multiple expenses of proceeding with-
out them.
As we have seen, rules are also a way of overcoming myopia and
some unusual collective action problems. All of us adopt rules in our
everyday life, whether presumptive or conclusive. A person may
adopt a rule—simply for himself—in order to diminish the costs of
decision in particular cases; or in order to protect himself from
shortsightedness, in the form of behavior that has high short-term
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benefits, low short-term costs, but high aggregate costs and low
aggregate benefits; or in order to ensure against the kind of intraper-
sonal collective action problem that arises when he fails to take ade-
quate account of what we might metaphorically see as the
“successive selves” affected by his acts.
For example, Jones might decide never to take a drink during the
weekday, or never to go into work on Saturday, or to exercise every
other day. Jones may do this in order not to have to make individual-
ized decisions, and in order to adopt rules that produce good aggre-
gate outcomes notwithstanding particular cases of high costs and
low benefits. Even to consider whether to make an exception in a
particular case may not be worthwhile—because if one exception is
possible, the possibility of exception is omnipresent, and the costs of
deliberation go up enormously. The phenomenon of imperfect but
efficient, optimal, or otherwise desirable rule-bound choice is om-
nipresent in personal lives.
There are analogues at the social and legal level. Rules may facili-
tate social decisionmaking by reducing the costs of individualized
consideration. If we adopt a rule to the effect that there will be two
senators, rather than three or six, we do not have to decide in every
case how many senators there will be, and this is a highly facilitative
device for a democracy. As a social practice, constitutionalism has
this general feature. The rules embodied in constitutionalism, often
thought to conflict with democracy, in fact make it possible.
Legal rules can also overcome social myopia. Myopia may take
the form of decisions whose long-term costs dwarf their long-term
benefits, despite cases where the short-term benefits are high.
Consider mandatory retirement rules and the social security disability
grid.11 Constitutionalism is also an attempt to counteract decisions
that seem to make short-term sense, but that are in the long run
harmful or self-defeating.
Of course these costs may be lower than those produced by some
rules, and thus we cannot say, in the abstract, whether rules are bet-
ter than rulelessness from the standpoint of private citizens. A com-
pany would probably prefer a law calling for an assessment of five
factors before any pollutant may be banned, to a law saying that all
pollutants are banned. A homosexual rights group would prefer a
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Rules and Rulelessness 23
law saying that discrimination against homosexuals will be prohib-
ited where a three-part test so suggests, to a law saying that discrim-
ination against homosexuals is always acceptable. We can still say,
however, that factors will produce costs of certain kinds, and that
these costs may be very high. Note in this regard that mechanical
formulas often perform better than clinical discretion in the areas of
medical diagnosis and college admission.12
2. Rules are impersonal and blind; they promote equal treatment
and reduce the likelihood of bias and arbitrariness.
We have seen that rules may reduce human error in the form of
confusion or ignorance; they can also counteract something worse,
that is, bias, favoritism, or discrimination on the part of people who
decide particular cases. In this way they are associated with impar-
tiality. Their impartiality is captured in the notion that the Goddess
justice is “blind.” Rules are blind to many features of a case that
might otherwise be relevant and that are relevant in some social
contexts—religion, social class, good looks, height, and so
forth—and also to many things on whose relevance people have
great difficulty in agreeing.
The claim that rules promote generality and in that sense equal
treatment requires an important qualification. Of course rules sup-
press many differences among cases; they single out a particular fea-
ture of a range of cases and subsume all such cases under a single
umbrella. In this sense, rules make irrelevant features of cases that
might turn out, on reflection by people making particular judg-
ments, to be relevant indeed. Should everyone who has exceeded 60
miles per hour be treated the same way? Should everyone falling in a
particular unfortunate spot in a social security grid be denied bene-
fits? If equality requires the similarly situated to be treated similarly,
the question is whether people are similarly situated, and rules do not
permit a particularized inquiry on that score. In this way rules may
actually fail to promote equal treatment as compared with ruleless-
ness.13
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3. Rules serve appropriately both to embolden and to constrain
decision-makers in particular cases.14
A special advantage of rules is that judges (and others) can be
emboldened to enforce them even when the particular stakes and
the particular political costs are high. Rules that have been set out by
the legislature or by the judges themselves may provide the basis for
courageous decisions that might otherwise be difficult to reach and
to legitimate. The fact that rules resolve all cases before the fact can
thus make it possible for officials to stick with certain judgments
when they should do so, but when they might be tempted to devi-
ate.
Suppose, for example, that the Supreme Court has set out the
Miranda rules, and that everyone knows that they will be applied
mechanically and to every criminal defendant. If so, judges can refer
to those rules, and in a sense hide behind them, in cases in which
the defendant is especially despised, and in which it is tempting to
say that the rules should yield before a balancing test to be resolved
unfavorably to the defendant. Similarly for the implementing doc-
trines for free speech. For example, if the rule banning discrimina-
tion against viewpoints is well-entrenched in the law of free speech,
judges can refer to that rule in invalidating laws banning flag-burn-
ing, even in the face of severe and otherwise irresistible public pres-
sure. The key advantage here (one that can be a disadvantage too) is
that rules decide cases in advance of the point of application. They
also make it unnecessary and even illegitimate to return to first prin-
ciples. If judges decided on the content of law at the point of
(political charged) application, and if they had to go back to first
principles, they might not adhere to those principles at all when the
stakes are high, or there would be sharp disagreements among peo-
ple who thought that the rules were bad on balance.
In one sense rules reduce responsibility for particular cases, by al-
lowing the authority to claim that it is not his choice, but the choice
of others who have laid down the rule. Officials can claim that the
previous choice is not being made but simply followed. When the
rule is ambiguous, this claim is fraudulent. But it is true when the
rule is clear. In a system in which rules are binding, and are seen to
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Rev 1175, 1185 (1989).
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be binding, the law can usefully stiffen the judicial spine in cases in
which this is a valuable guarantor of individual liberty against public
attack.
At the same time, rules reduce the risk that illegitimate or irrele-
vant factors will enter into the decision, at least compared with
standards or factors, where judicial discretion is broader at the point
of application and where unarticulated considerations may weigh in
the balance. A judge’s sympathetic or unsympathetic reaction to a
particular party (or lawyer) may tip the balance in a case based on
factors. This is less likely when rules are operative. Here too rules
have large virtues in a system that aspires to decisions amidst hetero-
geneity.
4. Rules promote predictability and planning for private actors,
Congress, and others.
From the standpoint of people who are subject to public force, it
is especially important to know what the law is before the point of
application. Indeed, it may be more important to know what the
law is than to have a law of any particular kind.
In modern regulation, a pervasive problem is that members of
regulated classes face ambiguous and conflicting guidelines, so that
they do not know how to plan. Under a balancing test, neither the
government nor affected citizens may know in advance about their
obligations. Consider, by contrast, the Miranda rules. A special
virtue of those rules is that they tell the police actually what must be
done, and therefore eliminate guessing-games that can be so de-
structive to planning ex ante. So too in the environmental area,
where clear rules are often far better than the “reasonableness” in-
quiry characteristic of the common law.
5. Rules increase visibility and accountability.
When rules are at work, it is clear who is responsible, and who is
to be blamed if things go wrong. This is most obviously valuable
when the rulemaker has a high degree of accountability and legiti-
macy; consider the President and the Congress. A large problem
with a system based on standards or factors is that no one knows
who is really responsible if, for example, the air stays dirty or is
cleaned up at excessive cost. If the Miranda rules create a problem,
the Court is obviously the source of the problem. But if a due process
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calculus based on factors produces mistakes of various sorts, it is pos-
sible that the Court itself will escape the scrutiny it deserves. People
may blame the lower-court judges assessing the factors, rather than
the Court itself.
There is a related point. Without rules, the exercise of discretion
can be invisible, or at least less visible to the public and affected par-
ties. At the same time, rules allow the public to monitor compliance.
This monitoring is harder to achieve in a system of factors.
6. Rules avoid the humiliation of subjecting people to exercises of
official discretion in their particular case.
A special advantage of rules is that because of their fixity, ex ante
quality, and generality, they make it unnecessary for citizens to ask
an official for permission to engage in conduct that they seek. Rules
turn citizens into right-holders, able to ask for certain treatment as a
matter of right. Discretion, standards, or factors are more likely to
make citizens into supplicants, requesting official help, with officials
encountering the details of the situation of each citizen.
Importantly, factors allow mercy, in the form of relief from rigid
rules. But rules have the comparative advantage of forbidding offi-
cials from being punitive, or unmoved, for irrelevant or invidious
reasons, by a particular applicant’s request.
Compare, for example, a mandatory retirement for people over
the age of 70 with a law permitting employers to discharge employ-
ees who, because of their age, are no longer able to perform their job
adequately. One advantage of the former over the latter is that if you
are an employee, it is especially humiliating and stigmatizing to have
employers decide whether you have been rendered incompetent by
age. A rule avoids this inquiry altogether, and it might be favored for
this reason even if it is both over- and under-inclusive.
IV. Against Rules, I: Are Rules Too Conservative? Are
They Associated With Unduly Free Markets?
I now identify three arguments against rules. The first challenge
is that rules embody “formal equality” and are for this reason too
conservative, or too closely associated with excessively free markets;
in this way rules are said to be sectarian after all. The second
challenge is that rules cannot do what is claimed for them, since
disagreements about foundational issues will indeed break out at the
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moment of application. The third challenge is that the generality of
rules, and their blindness to particulars, is a political vice, because a
just system allows equity, or adaptation to the particulars of
individual cases. There is nothing in the first challenge, some
important truth in the second, and some enduring wisdom in the
third.
A. The Rule of Law As A Check on Legislation
Some people think that the requirements of the rule of law pro-
vide an important check on partisanship or selectivity insofar as these
are reflected in law. On this view, the rule of law is a requirement of
generality, and the requirement of generality forbids law from im-
posing selective benefits or selective burdens. In this notion lies
much of the debate over the ideas of impartiality and neutrality in
law.
An influential discussion appears in Justice Robert Jackson’s con-
curring opinion in the Railway Express case.15 New York City pro-
hibited anyone from operating an “advertising vehicle” on the
streets, that is, a vehicle that sells its exterior for advertising purposes.
The New York law exempted from the general prohibition the use
of advertising on vehicles that are engaged in the ordinary business
of the owner, and not used mainly or only for advertising.
Railway Express, a company operating nearly 2000 trucks for
advertising purposes, challenged the New York law under the due
process and equal protection clauses. The Supreme Court upheld the
law, emphasizing that judges should defer to legislatures, and noting
that the local authorities might have believed that people who ad-
vertise their own wares on trucks do not present the same traffic
problems. The Court added that “the fact that New York City sees
fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not
touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as
the vivid displays on Times Square, is immaterial. It is no require-
ment of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradi-
cated or none at all.”16 In this way the Court rejected the idea that
the principle of generality imposed serious limits on legislative classi-
fications.
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28 Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics
Justice Jackson took this seemingly mundane case as an occasion
for celebrating the use of the equal protection clause as a guarantor
of the rule of law, understood as a ban on selectivity. Justice Jackson
began by contrasting the due process clause with the equal protec-
tion clause. The due process clause does not require equality; instead
it imposes an absolute, flat barrier to legislative enactments. In this
way it “leaves ungoverned and ungovernable conduct which many
people find objectionable.” But the equal protection clause is not
similarly disabling. “It merely means that the prohibition or regula-
tion must have a broader impact.” The requirement of breadth in
turn serves a democratic function. “[T]here is no more effective
practical guaranty against arbitrary or unreasonable government than
to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing
opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those of-
ficials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legis-
lation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be vis-
ited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can take no
better measure to assure that laws will be just than to require that
laws be equal in operation.”
In Justice Jackson’s view, a requirement of generality helps to
flush out illegitimate reasons. If the law is imposed on some but not
all, it may be based on prejudice. Perhaps the law is a means of op-
pressing a particular group; if it cannot be passed unless it is partial,
we may suppose that it is undergirded by something other than the
articulated justification. Perhaps it is a form of rent-seeking, or sup-
ported solely by private pressure.
There is much good sense here. A system of law should require
public-regarding justifications for the denial of benefits or the im-
position of burdens. Moreover, the requirement of generality can
bring into effect political checks that would otherwise be too weak
to prevent oppressive legislation from going forward.
But how are we to know that a seemingly narrow enactment
must be applied generally? Is it illegitimate (for example) to exempt
labor unions from the antitrust laws, electric cars from the Clean Air
Act, insane people from the ordinary operation of the homicide
laws, or small businesses from occupational safety and health regula-
tion? Is it illegitimate to say that blind people cannot receive drivers’
licenses, or that felons cannot vote?
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To know whether generality is required, we have to know
whether there are relevant similarities and relevant differences be-
tween those burdened and those not burdened by legislation. No
one thinks that “generality” should be required when there are rele-
vant differences. No one supposes that the speed limit laws are unac-
ceptable because they do not apply to police officers and ambulance
drivers operating within the course of their official duties. Indeed,
Justice Jackson did not vote to invalidate the New York law. “[T]he
hireling may be put in a class by himself and may be dealt with dif-
ferently than those who act on their own.”
We should conclude that any requirement of equal treatment
depends on a substantive theory establishing whether there are rele-
vant differences between the cases to which a law is applied and the
cases to which it is not. Sometimes the necessary theory is readily
available. If a law says that in order to receive federal employment,
everyone who is not white must take certain tests, we can easily see
that the grounds for the distinction are illegitimate, and Justice
Jackson’s analysis seems unimpeachable. But sometimes the plea for
generality is based on controversial grounds. In such cases, the
requirement of generality hides a range of substantive judgments,
and those judgments cannot be supplied by the requirement itself.
With all this, we have come far from rules and the rule of law.
In deciding whether a plausible ground for discrimination and
hence selectivity is a permissible one, we are not merely requiring
generality, but second-guessing judgments about who is similar to
whom. The rule of law, by itself, does not have the resources to re-
solve the resulting debates. The requirement of rule-bound decisions
has numerous virtues; but we should be careful not to overstate what
it requires.17
B. Is the Rule of Law Associated With Free Markets?
These points provide reason to doubt Friedrich Hayek’s influen-
tial discussion of rules and the rule of law. Hayek identifies the rule
of law with a norm of “impartiality.” Its antonym is a system of
“planning,” in which the state picks winners and losers. Hayek as-
sociates the requirement of generality with that of impartiality.
Because the rule of law does not pick out particular winners and
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30 Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics
losers, it does not play favorites, and in this sense it is impartial.
Hayek therefore concludes that there is a close association between
the rule of law and free markets, both of which require generality.
But what does the requirement of generality forbid? Hayek does
not disapprove of much that is done in the name of the regulatory
state. Government provision of public services is on his view unob-
jectionable.18 Nor does he disapprove of “general rules specifying
conditions which everybody who engages in a certain activity must
observe.” This category includes regulations of production, maxi-
mum hour laws, laws banning dangerous products, or laws protect-
ing conditions in the workplace. Hayek thereby accepts, at least in
principle, much of what is done by the modern administrative state.
What, then, is prohibited? Hayek is concerned about those
measures that “involve arbitrary discrimination between persons.”19
This category includes most importantly “decisions as to who is to be
allowed to provide different services or commodities, at what prices
or in what quantities—in other words, measures designed to control
the access to different trades and occupations, the terms of sale, and
the amounts to be produced or sold.”20
Here Hayek appears to be speaking of the related requirements
of generality, impartiality, and equality; his argument is very much
like that of Justice Jackson. Certain measures violate these require-
ments because they make arbitrary distinctions. But how do we
know whether a distinction is arbitrary? How do we know whether
the state can “control the access to different trades and occupations”?
It is not impermissible for the state to require taxi drivers to show
that they have good eyesight, or to ban people from practicing
medicine without meeting certain requirements of medical compe-
tence.
Hayek himself emphasizes that the state may impose occupa-
tional qualifications.21 It therefore emerges that the state is banned
from imposing qualifications only when they are truly arbitrary. To
decide this question, it is necessary to develop a theory of appropriate
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Rules and Rulelessness 31
qualifications. But the rule of law, standing by itself, does not supply
that theory.
What about price controls? It is possible to imagine a system
that imposed stable price minima and maxima, as in the minimum
wage laws or various regulations governing agricultural requirements.
So long as the set prices are stable, these requirements seem consis-
tent with the rule of law (which is of course not at all to say that
they are good policy). Hayek is concerned that any prices must be
constantly adjusted, but this is an uncertain empirical claim. Hayek
also thinks that since they abandon the touchstone of supply and
demand, any governmentally-fixed prices “will not be the same for
all sellers” and that they will “discriminate between persons on es-
sentially arbitrary grounds.”22 His conclusion is that all controls of
prices and quantities “must be arbitrary.”
Of course government controls of prices and quantities are
usually harmful or even disastrous, and much of what can be said
against them relates to their rejection of the forces of supply and
demand. But insofar as he is invoking the rule of law, Hayek’s claim
is obscure. Price controls can satisfy all of the requirements described
above; if the controls are stable, public, general, and so forth, they
are consistent with the rule of law. The judgment that they are
“arbitrary” stems not from the notion of the rule of law, but from an
independent theory, grounded in ideas about efficiency and liberty,
to the effect that the appropriate prices and quantities of goods and
services are set by the market. That is a reasonable judgment, but it is
not part of the rule of law. It is an independent point requiring in-
dependent defense.
It might be tempting at this point to suggest that much of
Hayek’s discussion is simply confused, and that the rule of law has
nothing to do with markets at all. What can be said on behalf of
markets, or against price controls, is different from what can be said
about rule-free government. But this conclusion would be too sim-
ple. There are at least three common features. First, the rule of law
does not make ex post adjustments. Rules operate prospectively; they
take the ex ante perspective. The same is true for markets. Second,
there is a sense in which both rules and markets are “no respecter of
persons.” For advocates of the rule of law, government, like justice,
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should be “blind.” Markets are similarly blind. Third, and perhaps
paradoxically, Hayek is concerned to ensure against measures that
impose inappropriate informational demands on government. Price-
fixing is especially objectionable because it requires government to do
something that it lacks information to do well. The same argument
can be invoked on behalf of (at least many) rules. By setting out rules
of the road, or requirements for the transfer of land, government
can appropriately allocate informational burdens between itself and
others.
On the other hand, all of the laws that Hayek finds compatible
with the rule of law do, in a sense, pick winners and losers. Certainly
this is true for minimum wage laws and for maximum hour laws; it
is also true for the provision of governmental services. And though
the common law may not pick winners and losers, it is often quite
predictable who will be favored and who will be disfavored under the
ordinary rules of property, tort, and contract. It is likely, for example,
that disabled people are unlikely to do well in a market system run
under the common law.
Finally, it is at least a theoretical possibility that a system of
planning could comply with the rule of law, at least if the “plans”
were announced in advance and if expectations were firmly pro-
tected. Probably most real-world systems of planning must shift too
rapidly to conform to these requirements. This may in the end by
Hayek’s point: To produce equality or other social goals,, and to
counteract the outcomes of markets, planners must interfere with
markets so frequently and on such an ad hoc basis, or displace them
so completely, that predictability, protection of expectations, and
control of official discretion become difficult or impossible. This
point seems both true and important. It is part of the enduring ar-
gument against certain forms of socialism. But Hayek seems to have
something else in mind, having to do with the way in which plans
play favorites. The notion that plans play favorites is parasitic on an
unarticulated understanding of fair processes and distributions. That
understanding has nothing to do with the rule of law.
These points cast doubt not only Hayek’s view but also and for
the same reasons on Marxist-inspired attacks on the rule of law.
Consider Morton Horwitz’ suggestion that “[u]nless we are prepared
to succumb to Hobbesian pessimism ‘in this dangerous century,’ I do
not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as ‘an
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unqualified human good! It undoubtedly restrains power, but it also
prevents power’s benevolent exercise. It creates formal equality—a
not inconsiderable virtue—but it promotes substantive inequality by
creating a consciousness that radically separates law from politics,
means from ends, processes from outcomes. By promoting procedu-
ral justice it enables the shrewd, the calculating, and the wealthy to
manipulate its forms to their own advantage. And it ratifies and le-
gitimates an adversarial, competitive, and atomistic conception of
human relations.”23
There is much to be said about this passage. For present purposes
the key point is that the passage takes the rule of law to require
much more than in fact it does. Does the rule of law forbid the
pursuit of substantive equality through, for example, progressive in-
come taxes, welfare and employment programs, antidiscrimination
laws, and much more? Like Hayek, Horwitz appears to identify the
rule of law with (a particular conception of) market ordering. The
identification is unwarranted.
I conclude that the rule of law does not have the features that
Hayek understands it to have. A familiar challenge to rules—that
they are connected with merely formal equality—is therefore unper-
suasive. Rules could provide that no person may have more than one
dollar more than anyone else, or that the average income of men
and women must be the same, or that all racial groups must have the
same proportional wealth. There is no association between rules on
the one hand and conservatism, free markets, or inequality on the
other.
V. Against Rules, II: Are Rules Feasible?
A. Challenges
Some people deny the feasibility of rules and the rule of law.24
Usually they focus on the internal point of view—on how lawyers
and judges, operating within the legal system, figure out what rules
mean. If rules are really understood as full ex ante allocation of legal
rights, it is said, rules are impossible. Encounters with particular
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cases will confound the view that things really have been fully settled
in advance. In this view, the need for interpretation, and the likeli-
hood of competing interpretations founded on disagreements about
the good or the right, defeat the project of following rules.
A central point here is that because of the nature of language,
legal rules will leave a variety of gaps and ambiguities, and even when
the meaning of a legal term is clear in the abstract or in the dictio-
nary, uncertainty may break out at the point of application. If we are
fanatical about limiting interpretive discretion, we will be disturbed
to find that laws that apparently amount to rules call for moral or
political judgments by interpreters at the point of application. But
perhaps this is not a decisive problem with a system of rules. Some
laws that appear to be rules are really standards; they invite moral or
political judgments, and laws that use words like “equal” or
“reasonable” or “carcinogen” may fall in this category. To this extent,
such rules do not qualify as rules at all, for they do not specify
outcomes in advance. A more fundamental objection to the project
of rule-following is that in order for rules to be interpreted, there
need be no clear invitation for moral or political judgments from the
text of the rule itself, or from the people who wrote the rule.
Perhaps laws that appear confining, and quite rule-like, will require
interpreters to give them content at the point of application.
Perhaps the interpretation of rules always requires substantive judg-
ments of some kind—not only the substantive judgment to be
bound by law itself, but also substantive understandings that go into
the reading of legal terms. If this is so, a degree of law-making,
through encounter with particular cases, is inevitable. Even appar-
ently rigid rules do not fully allocate entitlements ex ante.
To outline the argument in advance: The very fact that a rule
has at least one exception, and the very fact that the finding of an
exception is part of ordinary interpretation, means that in every case,
a judge is presented with the question whether the rule is best in-
terpreted to cover the application at hand. Any judgment on this
matter depends on a moral or political claim about relevant differ-
ences and relevant similarities. Hence the interpretation of rules
means that legal entitlements have not been fully allocated ex ante.
A degree of contingent, ex post allocation is inevitable.
In short, substantive claims may lie behind all claims about what
the law is. When the meaning of law seems to be a simple matter of
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fact, it is not because there has been no resort to substantive argu-
ment, but because people agree on what substantive argument is
persuasive under the circumstances. This is so not merely in the
sense that people agree that as a moral matter, they ought to apply
the law. It is so in the more fundamental sense that their view about
what the law means has an important moral or political dimension.
The positivist project of identifying the law by reference (solely) to
its sources runs afoul of the fact that interpretation inevitably de-
pends on something other than sources of law.25 And if this is true,
ex post judgments are unavoidable.
B. Substantive Ex Post Judgments Everywhere?
If contexts over substance are unavoidable, the project of rule-
following and (a certain understanding of) the rule of law may well
be threatened. At least this is so if such contests involve moral and
political issues in particular cases, for if they do, the meaning of rules
is determined by moral and political judgments at the point of appli-
cation.
Let us turn to an example. Language will never, or almost never,
be interpreted so as to reach applications in a way that would
produce absurdity or gross injustice. There is an old maxim, from
Chief Justice Coke: Cessante rationae, cessat ipsa lex. Suppose, for
example, that a law forbids people from driving over 55 miles per
hour on a certain street. Jones goes 75 miles per hour because he is
driving an ambulance, with a comatose accident victim, to the
hospital; Smith goes 90 because she is a police officer following a
fleeing felon; Wilson goes 80 because he is being chased by a
madman with a gun. In all these cases, the driver may well have a
legally acceptable excuse, even if there is no law “on the books” al-
lowing an exception in these circumstances. If rules have exceptions
in cases of palpable absurdity or injustice, the denial of an exception
depends on a moral or political judgment to the effect that the par-
ticular result is not palpably absurd or unjust.
In short, the mere possibility of an exception or an excuse in all
or almost all cases involving rules—excuses found as such through a
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familiar interpretive route— means that there is a possibility of an
exception or an excuse everywhere. It means that even the most
well-specified rules do not offer a full ex ante specification of legal
rights. When an excuse is found insufficient—when Collins is not
allowed an exemption from the speed limit law because he was late
for work—it is not only because of the text, but also because of some
judgment (usually tacit and rarely made in advance of the actual case)
whether the application of the statute is absurd or grossly unjust. So
long as we say that absurd applications will not be permitted, it al-
ways remains possible to urge, in the context of a case, that the par-
ticular application is absurd.
My conclusion is that when interpretation of rules seems me-
chanical, a judgment is really being made to the effect that the ap-
plication is not bizarre or unjust. Judgments of this kind are usually
tacit and obvious—usually so extremely obvious that they take place
very quickly and do not appear to be judgments at all. But they are
nonetheless ex post judgments.
Turn now to a case that involves more than one rule. Suppose
the Supreme Court says that in the face of interpretive doubt,
statutes should be construed to as not to apply outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States, and also that in the face of inter-
pretive doubt, statutes should be interpreted in accordance with the
views of the administrative agency charged with enforcing them.
Suppose that a case arises in which the agency charged with enforc-
ing a civil rights law concludes that the law applies outside the
United States. What should a court do when faced with two inter-
pretive rules that conflict? A legal system may contain no rule-like
answer to this question. If it does not, disputes may break out at the
point of application, when judges exercise discretion so as to ac-
commodate the two rules, or to develop principles for harmonizing
them. If judges or others are concerned to ensure that the system
really is one of rules, they may come up with rules of priority, so that
conflicts between rules can be resolved by reference to rules.
In short: We should acknowledge that the meaning of rules is a
product of substantive judgments, often at least partly moral in char-
acter. I think that this point is decisive against approaches that insist
that from the internal point of view, it is possible to say what the
law is without making some ex post judgments about what the law
should be.
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C. The Rule of Law Chastened But Mostly Intact
How damaging is this to the project of following rules, or to the
rule of law? Certainly it suggests that for judges and administrators,
the project of interpreting law solely by reference to ex ante judg-
ments and sources will be incomplete. The sources may leave gaps to
be filled at the point of application. But this is not as damaging as it
seems. Almost all real-world cases involving the meaning of rules are
very easy.
In particular, the contestable, ex post, substantive judgments that
underlie readings of rules are often widely shared, or supported by
good reasons whether or not widely shared. Usually the literal
application of statutory language does not produce absurdity. Rules
of priority, laid down ex ante, are sometimes available when more
than one rule applies. These points are enough to allow the rule of
law to survive as an entirely practical project.
In any case it is often feasible to rely on the literal or dictionary
definition of legal terms, and courts could do this even in cases in
which such reliance leads to apparently unreasonable applications.26
Probably we must acknowledge that a good legal system will allow
exceptions to rules in cases of absurdity or gross injustice; but it is
feasible not to do allow exceptions, and the category of exceptions, if
it exists, might be reserved for the most bizarre cases. In this way the
category of exceptions might be made exceedingly small; in principle,
the category might not exist at all. Literalism might be urged for
pragmatic purposes, indeed for some of the same pragmatic reasons
that support ruleness in general—as a means of promoting pre-
dictability and limiting judicial discretion at the point of application.
It is important to appreciate the fact that if judges cannot look
into the reasonableness of the application, some unfortunate results
will follow in particular cases; but we might believe that the results
will be superior, in the aggregate, to those that would follow from
allowing judges to apply rules literally only in cases in which the
application makes sense. We might distrust a situation in which
judges felt free to explore the justification for the rule and the rea-
sonableness of the application when deciding whether to apply the
rule.
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Read literally, rules are often over- and under-inclusive if assessed
by reference to their purposes. There is always a gap between the
justification of a rule—usually taking the form of a standard—and
the rule itself. Indeed, there is a plurality of justifications for every
rule, with some very specific (“to ensure that the park is quiet”) to
some very general (“to make the world better”). The gap between
justification and rule is part of a familiar argument against rules, and
perhaps an argument for an approach to rule-interpretation that al-
lows exceptions in cases of absurdity or injustice. But it is not an ar-
gument that literal readings are not feasible.27
Courts might even seek to interpret words literally in all cases,
and thus to avoid making any exceptions at all. This would be an
odd interpretive strategy in light of the likely existence of at least a
few truly compelling cases for exception. But the strategy is feasible.
Recall here that a principal purpose of rules is to specify outcomes in
advance of actual decisions, and note that mandatory rules are differ-
ent from rules of thumb precisely because mandatory rules do not tell
their interpreters and their objects to look at the rationale for the
rule in particular cases.
Whether literal readings, when feasible, are reasonable or right is
a complex issue, having to do with our faith in interpreters, our faith
in those who make rules in the first place, the aggregate risk of error,
and the possibility of legislative corrections of absurd results in par-
ticular cases. The choice between literal meanings and exceptions for
absurdity is itself a decision about the appropriate nature of law. But
this is not a point about feasibility.
We have concluded, then, that rules cannot be interpreted with-
out shared understandings of various sorts, and usually without resort
to substantive ex post arguments of certain kinds. We have
concluded as well that a degree of law-making power is exercised at
the point of application, at least in a system in which literal language
will not be understood to produce absurdity or gross injustice, and
when (as is inescapable) such language leaves ambiguities or gaps. In
this way the case for rules must be chastened and sometimes
cautious. If we define rules as full ex ante allocations of legal rights,
we are unlikely to have many legal provisions that always operate as
rules. But this does not make it impossible to decide cases by
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reference to rules. Whether rule-bound decisions are preferable to
the alternatives is another question; it is to that question that I now
turn.
VI. Against Rules, III: Are Rules Obtuse?
In many spheres of law, people do not rely on rules at all. A rule-
book for telling jokes may be helpful; perhaps people who rely on
such books are funnier than they would otherwise be; but if you re-
ally tried to tell jokes by following clear rules laid down in advance,
you probably would not be very funny. There are no clear rules for
dealing with friends in distress. Doctors are familiarly said to follow
rules, and surely they often do; but some illuminating accounts treat
medicine as largely a matter of casuistry, in which experienced people
do not follow rules, but instead build up judgments analogically and
from experience with past cases. They rely on rules of thumb rather
than mandatory rules.28 They make judgments at the point of appli-
cation.
A. Rules are both over- and under-inclusive by reference to the reasons
that justify them.
If strictly followed, rules often produce significant error and
hence arbitrariness in particular cases. As we have seen, the justifica-
tions that underlie the rules will not support all applications to
which they apply by their terms. More generally, experience will
turn up considerations or contexts that make it odd or worse to apply
the rule to the particular case. For this reason it is sometimes ineffi-
cient to make decisions by rule, because any rule that people can
generate will produce too much inaccuracy in particular cases.
Perhaps any rule now available would produce inefficient outcomes,
and perhaps particularized decisions would be better on this score.
Consider, for example, the case of college admissions. We might
think that any simple rule would produce too many errors from the
standpoint of the goal of obtaining a good student body. Even a
complex formula, allowing several factors to count but also weight-
ing them and hence minimizing discretion, might produce many
mistakes. The social security grid is sometimes said to produce con-
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spicuous injustice in individual cases, and at least in principle, it is
possible that the aggregate error rate would be lower with
individualized decisions. Or consider the matter of criminal
sentencing. While open-ended discretion has been persuasively
criticized, it seems clear that the range of relevant variables is very
wide, and that rigidly rule-bound decisions could produce much
error and injustice.
In modern regulatory law, this problem is associated with the
pervasive phenomenon of “site level unreasonableness.”29 This phe-
nomenon occurs when a general rule is applied to situations in
which it makes no sense. Consider a requirement that all eating
places have two fire exits, or that all places of employment be
equipped with ramps as well as staircases, or that all pollution sources
use certain expensive antipollution devices. (Many more examples
could be added.) The general rule can produce enormous costs for
few benefits in the particular site or in many particular sites; yet ad-
ministrators often insist on mechanical compliance with the general
rule. Perhaps it would be best to dispense with rules and instead to
allow firms to comply by showing adequate performance under a set
of factors, a process to be overseen by flexible inspectors.
B. Rules can be outrun by changing circumstances.
Rules are often shown to be perverse through new developments
that make the existing rules anachronistic. Those who issue rules
cannot know the full range of particular situations to which the
rules will eventually be applied, and in the new circumstances, the
rules may be hopelessly outmoded. Consider the regulation of
banking and telecommunications. With the development of auto-
mated teller machines, prohibitions on branch banking make abso-
lutely no sense; with the rise of cable television, a regulatory frame-
work designed for three television networks is built on wildly false
assumptions. Even well-designed rules in the 1970s may be utterly
inadequate for the 1990s. In the face of rapidly changing technol-
ogy, rules for regulation of telecommunications will become entirely
ill-suited to contemporary markets. For this reason it may be best to
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avoid rules altogether, or at least to create a few simple rules that al-
low room for private adaptation.30
C. Abstraction and generality sometimes mask bias.
When people are differently situated, it may be unfair or oth-
erwise wrong to treat them the same, that is, to apply the identical
rule to them. If everyone must use stairs, people in wheelchairs will
face special disadvantages. If everyone must pay to enter museums,
people without money will be unable to go to museums. If every
employee must lack the capacity to become pregnant, most women
will be frozen out of the workforce.31
By ignoring individual circumstances, general rules can harm
identifiable groups with distinctive characteristics, and in that sense
reflect bias despite or even because of their generality. A familiar un-
derstanding of equality requires the similarly situated to be treated
the same; a less familiar but also important understanding requires
the differently situated to be treated differently, also in the interest
of equality. General rules might abridge equality to the extent that
they do not allow people to speak of relevant differences.
D. Rules drive discretion underground.
When rules produce inaccuracy in particular cases, people in a
position of authority may simply ignore them. Discretion is exercised
through a mild form of civil disobedience, and it is hard to police or
even to see. Thus in Woodson v. North Carolina,32 the Court invali-
dated the mandatory death penalty in part on the ground that the
mandatory rule could not possibly be mandatory in practice. In fact
juries would refuse to sentence people to death, but for reasons that
would not be visible and accessible.
“Jury nullification” of broad and rigid rules is a familiar and often
celebrated phenomenon. Similarly, administrative agencies can sim-
ply refuse to enforce statutes when they are too rule-like in nature.
The Clean Air Act’s severe provisions for listed pollutants, operating
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in rule-like fashion, led the Environmental Protection Agency to
stop listing pollutants at all. Thus “the act’s absolute duties to re-
spond to danger prompted officials not to recognize the dangers in
the first place.”33
E. Rules allow evasion by wrongdoers.
Because rules have clear edges, they allow people to “evade” them,
by engaging in conduct that is technically exempted but that creates
the same or analogous harms. Rules, in short, are under-inclusive as
well as over-inclusive, if we refer to their background justifications.
And a problem with rules is that if judges cannot proceed by anal-
ogy, and extend the rule where the justification so suggests, people
will be able to engage in harmful conduct because of a mere techni-
cality. Here is another source of inefficiency via rules.
F. Rules can be dehumanizing and procedurally unfair; sometimes it i s
necessary or appropriate to seek individualized tailoring.
One conception of procedural justice—embodied in the due pro-
cess clause—grants people a hearing in order to show that a statute
has been accurately applied. Thus, for example, the Supreme Court
has held that someone who is deprived of welfare benefits has a
right to a hearing to contest the legitimacy of the deprivation.34
This understanding of due process fits well with a system of rules.
The whole point of the hearing is to see whether the rule has been
accurately applied. The hearing fortifies the rule.
But another conception of due process urges that people should
be allowed not merely to test the application of law to fact, but also
to urge that their case is different from those that have gone before,
and that someone in a position of authority ought to be required to
pay heed to the particulars of their situation. On this view, people
affected by the law ought to be permitted to participate in the for-
mulation of the very principle to be applied to their case.
VII. Factors
When rules fail, judges may rely on standards, or they may in-
stead proceed through analogies, in which we do not know, in ad-
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vance, whether we will have rules, standards, or something else. The
problems with rules can push participants in law in the direction of
standards, analogies, or some combination of the two.
Often judges and others who reject rules rely on instead on a set
of factors, and I will be using judgments based on factors as the basic
way to approach and evaluate rulelessness. Like analogies and stan-
dards, factors reveal some of the vices and virtues of rulelessness; in
their opposition to rules, they much overlap with judgments based
on standards or analogies. But judgments based on factors have some
distinctive features as well, and these are of considerable independent
interest.
The line between rules and factors is one of degree rather than
of kind. It should now be clear that rules are rarely or never unbend-
ing; their interpretation involves a measure of discretion; it is best to
speak of degrees of rule-ness rather than of rules or not. Similarly,
factors are not open-ended grants of discretion. Often they have
rule-like features insofar as they impose constraints on what may
happen at the point of application. We can be clearer about decision
by factors after exploring a few examples, and also after seeing why a
system of factors is often thought to be a superior method of deci-
sion—required, sometimes, by the Constitution itself. The law gov-
erning the death penalty is the best place to start.
A. Examples
In Furman v. Georgia,35 the Supreme Court, following
Papachristou, held that a rule-free death penalty violated the due
process clause—not because it was excessively barbaric for the state to
take life, but because the states allowed undue discretion in the in-
fliction of the ultimate penalty of death. The problem with the pre-
1970 death penalty was therefore procedural. States did not limit the
discretion of juries deciding who deserved to die.
North Carolina responded to Furman by enacting a “mandatory”
death penalty, eliminating judge and jury discretion. Under North
Carolina law, a mandatory death penalty was to be imposed for a
specified category of homicide offenses. No judge and no jury would
have discretion to substitute life imprisonment in cases falling
within that category. No judge and no jury would have discretion to
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decide who would live and who would die. In this way, North
Carolina attempted to apply sharp rule of law constraints to the area
of death sentencing.
In Woodson v. North Carolina,36 the Supreme Court held,
strikingly, that a mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional
because it was a rule. Invoking the need for individuation, the Court
said that “The belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like le-
gal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the
past life and habits of a particular offender.” According to the
Supreme Court, a serious constitutional shortcoming of the
mandatory death sentence
is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of rele-
vant aspects of the character and record of each convicted de-
fendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of
death. . . . A process that accords no significance to rele-
vant facets of the character and record of the individual
offender or the circumstances of the particular offense ex-
cludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigat-
ing factors stemming from the diverse frailties of hu-
mankind. It treats all persons convicted of a designated of-
fense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as
members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to
the blind infliction of the penalty of death.
What ultimately emerged from Woodson is a system in which
the death penalty is generally decided through the consideration of a
set of specified factors, in the form of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. It is this system of capital sentencing that, in the
current Court’s view, walks the constitutionally tolerable line be-
tween unacceptably mandatory rules and unacceptably broad discre-
tion. Of course some justices, most recently Justice Blackmun, have
contended that the line is too thin—that there is no possible system
of capital sentencing that adequately combines the virtues of indi-
vidualized consideration, required by Woodson, with the virtues of
non-arbitrary decision, required by Furman.
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Woodson arose in an especially dramatic setting, but the Court’s
preferred method—factors rather than rules—can be found in many
areas of the both life and law. For example, the Court offers no rules
for deciding how much in the way of procedure is required before
the state may take liberty or property.37 Any “rules,” the Court sug-
gests, would be too inaccurate and too insensitive to individual cir-
cumstance. Instead the Court requires an assessment of three fac-
tors: the nature and weight of the individual interest at stake; the
likelihood of an erroneous determination and the probable value of
additional safeguards; and the nature and strength of the govern-
ment’s interest. This somewhat open-ended multifactor balancing
test is quite different from what is anticipated in Papachristou. It
sacrifices predictability for the sake of accuracy in individual cases.
This is a pervasive choice in Anglo-American legal systems.
B. Factors Without Rules
What are the features of a system based on factors?
1. Multiple and diverse relevant criteria.
It is obvious that in a system of factors, decisions are based on
multiple and diverse criteria. No simple rule or principle can be ap-
plied to the case.
2. Difficulty of describing relevant factors ex ante.
In a system of factors, it is often impossible to describe exactly
what is relevant in advance. People know too little to be able to say.
Because of the informational burdens faced by those who lay down
the list of factors, two outcomes are likely. First, the relevant terms,
as they are identified in advance, may be too general and abstract to
contain sharp limits on what can be considered. The legal terms are
exhaustive but vague. They have to be specified to be made opera-
tional, and it is in the specification that a more complete account of
the factors will be provided. The specification is unlikely to exclude
other possible specifications in other settings. A significant degree of
law-making power can be found at the point of application.
The second possibility is that the relevant factors will be listed at
a high level of specificity, but there will be some proviso at the end,
including, for example, “such other factors as are deemed
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relevant”—to show that new factors may come up. The legal terms
are specific but nonexhaustive. Both of these strategies are pervasive
in American law.
3. Absence of a clear, a priori sense of the weight of the criteria.
It is typical of this procedure that the relevant criteria cannot be
assigned weights in advance. In deciding how much of a hearing is
required before someone may be deprived of something, for example,
we do not know how much weight to give to the government in-
terest in efficiency, or how much weight to assign to the individual
interest in ensuring against mistaken deprivations. Answers to ques-
tions of weight are offered in the context of concrete controversies,
and cannot be given in advance. As we will soon see, this notion is
related to the problem of commensurability.
4. Attentiveness to (much of) the whole situation.
The rule of law is abstract in the sense that it attends to only a
small part of a complex situation. If people are admitted to college
only on the basis of test scores, we have a rule. (I put to one side the
case of complex rules or formulas.) But a system of factors tends to
look closely at a wide range of particulars. In the college admission
setting, for example, officers might examine not just test scores, but
also grades, extracurricular activities, family background, geography,
race, gender, and much more. In the area of capital sentencing, ju-
ries and judges look to a wide range of variables relating to the of-
fender and the offense. In voting rights cases, courts sometimes ex-
plore many aspects of the context in order to test for discrimination.
On the other hand, it would be a mistake to say that a system of
factors is attentive to all aspects of the situation. There is no such
thing as attention to “all” particulars. Human and legal perception
are inevitably selective. Even in a discretionary admissions program,
for example, the authority is not expected to care about an applicant’s
initials or foot size. Similar constraints are imposed on the context of
capital sentencing. The set of relevant factors is disciplined by the
context in which the assessment occurs.
These points suggest that a system based on factors attends to
much of the whole situation but certainly not to all of it. And be-
cause decision by factors entails attention to much of the whole sit-
uation, and thus to a range of particulars, it is familiar to see people
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arguing that their case is relevantly different from those that have
come before. A litigant in case A can always say that in some
particular way, his case is relevantly different from case B.
5. Attentiveness to particulars; avoidance of abstractions.
In decision by reference to factors, courts are highly attentive to
particulars. Their decisions do not necessarily govern other situa-
tions; they are often said to be “fact-bound.” Abstractions and broad
principles are generally avoided. They may be too broad, contentious,
sectarian, divisive, and confusing. A special fear is that abstractions
will be both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. A prime goal of
decision by reference to factors is the avoidance of error through in-
sufficiently considered rules or principles—insufficiently considered
in the sense of insufficiently attuned to the full range of particular
cases.
6. Attention to precedent; analogical reasoning.
Rules provide consistency; but a system based on factors aspires
to do the same. Such a system aspires to ensure that all similarly sit-
uated people are treated similarly. A must be treated the same as B,
unless there is a principled reason to treat them differently.
In a system of factors, the relevant consistency is sought through
comparison with previous cases. Suppose, for example, that a full
trial-type hearing has been required before someone may be deprived
of afdc benefits. The question then arises whether a similar hearing
is required before someone may be deprived of social security dis-
ability benefits. Perhaps this case is different because many social se-
curity recipients are not poor, or because disability determinations do
not turn heavily on issues of credibility. Hence a full trial-type hear-
ing is not required; but the social security recipient is entitled at least
to some opportunity to counter the government’s claims in writing.
Then the question arises what kind of hearing is required before a
grade-school student may be suspended from school for misconduct.
Here the individual interest seems weaker still, and here the gov-
ernment can invoke the distinctive interest in avoiding undue for-
mality in student-teacher relations. Through routes of this sort, a
system based on factors can generate a complex set of outcomes, all
rationalized with each other. Analogical reasoning will therefore
produce local coherence.
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7. Diversely valued goods and problems of commensurability.
Usually the factors at work in the decisions I have in mind are
valued in qualitatively different ways. Moreover, those factors cannot
be placed on a single metric; they are not commensurable. To un-
derstand these claims, something must be said about diverse kinds of
valuation and about the difficult problem of incommensurability.
a. The factors involved in legal decisions are often qualita-
tively different from one another. It does seem clear that human
beings value goods, things, relationships, and states of affairs in di-
verse ways; all goodness is goodness-of-a-kind.38 There is of course a
distinction between instrumental and intrinsic goods. We value
some things purely or principally for use; other things, like knowl-
edge or friendship, have intrinsic value. But the distinction between
intrinsic and instrumental goods captures only a part of the picture.
Intrinsically valued things produce a range of diverse responses.
Some bring about wonder and awe; consider a mountain or certain
artistic works. Toward some people, we feel respect; toward others,
affection; toward others, love. People worship their deity. Negative
valuations are similarly diverse. To lose money is to lose an instru-
mental good (though one that might be used for intrinsic goods,
like the preservation of human life). To lose a friend is a different
matter. So too, our responses to intrinsic bads are diverse. Many of
the relevant distinctions play a role in law, as when beaches must be
compared with dollars, or protection of racial equality measured
against associational freedom. It is to be sure possible that the use of
a single metric, treating goods as relevantly the same, may have some
pragmatic advantages; cost-benefit analysis is based on this judg-
ment. But decisions based on factors tend to involve goods that are
understood to be valued in qualitatively diverse ways.
b. The relevant factors to be assessed by the legal system may
not be commensurable. Return, for example, to the idea that the
Constitution requires such hearings as are justified by an assessment
of three factors: the individual interest at stake; the likelihood of er-
ror and the probable value of additional safeguards; and the govern-
ment’s interest, pecuniary and nonpecuniary, in avoiding complex
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procedures. It would be odd to say that this assessment can be made
through lining up the relevant variables along any single metric.
There is no scale by which it makes sense to weigh these matters. If
we devise a scale, we will have to recharacterize the relevant goods in
a way that changes their character and effaces qualitative differences.
Perhaps this is justified for pragmatic reasons, but something will be
lost as well as gained.
As I understand the notion here, incommensurability occurs
when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric
without doing violence to our considered judgments about how
these goods are best characterized. By our considered judgments, I
mean our reflective assessments of how certain relationships and
events should be understood, evaluated, and experienced. The notion
of a single metric should be understood quite literally. By this I mean
a standard of valuation that (1) operates at a workable level of speci-
ficity, (2) fails to make qualitative distinctions, and (3) allows
comparison along the same dimension. In deciding cases according
to factors, there is often no such metric. Decisions nonetheless are
made, and they can be justified or criticized on the basis of reasons.
But those reasons do not amount to a single scale of value. Of course
rules are often developed on the basis of an assessment of
incommensurable goods.
These are brisk and inadequate remarks about a complex sub-
ject.39 For the moment my claim is simple: The factors that are
typically at stake in law are valued in different ways, and these factors
are not commensurable along any scale.
VIII. Choices, Positive and Normative
All this leaves two questions. Under what circumstances is it
appropriate to rely on factors rather than rules? And under what cir-
cumstances might a legal system be expected to do one rather than
the other?
It is unlikely that we will be able to generate a reliable and gen-
eral positive theory on this topic. Legislation is a complex product of
legislative self-interest, private influence, and public-spirited motiva-
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tions on the part of both legislators and those who influence them.
Judicial choices between rules and factors are at least equally difficult
to attribute to a single behavioral influence, or a set of behavioral in-
fluences. It is hard to imagine a simple testable hypothesis that
would not be falsified by many results in the world.
We are likely to do far better by identifying mechanisms by
which certain choices might be made, rather than law-like general-
izations by which choices are usually made.40 Moreover, the
occasional role of public spirit in legislative deliberations—from
legislators themselves or from people who influence them—means
that the normative and the positive cannot be so sharply separated.
Normative views about what makes best sense will undoubtedly
affect outcomes. The same is true of others faced with the choice
between rules and rulelessness, including judges and bureaucrats.
It is still possible to offer some rough-and-ready generalizations.
Most broadly, we can suggest that rules will be avoided (1) when the
lawmaker lacks information and expertise, so that the information
costs are too high to produce rules, (2) when it is difficult to decide
on rules because of political dissensus within the relevant institution,
so that the political costs of rules are too high to justify them, (3)
when people in position to decide whether to have rules do not fear
the bias, interest, or corruption of those who decide cases, (4) when
those who make the law do not disagree much with those who will
interpret the law, and hence when the law-makers do not need rules
to discipline administrators, judges, or others, and (5) when the ap-
plications of the legal provision are few in number or relevantly dif-
ferent from one another. Rules might thus be chosen when the er-
ror rate with the particular rules is relatively low, when the error rate
for rulelessness is high, and when the number of cases is large.
Of course there can be a considerable ex ante investment in
rulemaking, at least in the nonobvious cases, and at least if we seek
rules that have some degree of accuracy. On the other hand, the ab-
sence of rules may produce significant costs at the stage when par-
ticular decisions are made. One question is who bears these costs,
and how much power they have to minimize them. High invest-
ments in choosing the content of the law must be made by people
                                                                                                               
40See Jon Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences (1989), making
this claim much more generally.
Rules and Rulelessness 51
deciding on the particular applications; they must not only find the
facts but also find the law. Consider, for example, the problems of
deciding whether airline pilots over the age of 60 are still able to do
their jobs competently. Such decisions will be time-consuming, may
produce unequal treatment, and may create a lot of error under the
pressure of the moment (mistaken stereotypes about people over 60,
or misplaced sympathy for discharged employees). Such decisions
may also impair predictability and thus create high costs for people
trying to order their affairs under law.
Where those who make the law are not the same as those who
interpret and enforce it, there will be complex pressures. On the one
hand, the lawmakers may distrust the interpreters and enforcers, and
may therefore seek to impose rules. If everyone is aligned in interest,
the costs of rulelessness will be diminished, since the lawmakers
need not fear that interpreters and enforcers will have agendas of
their own. On the other hand, a split between lawmaking on the
one hand and law-interpreting/law-enforcement on the other can
create some pressure to avoid rules. Here is the key point: When
law-making is split from law-interpretation and law-enforcement,
many of the costs of producing clarity ex ante will be faced by law-
makers themselves, whereas many of the costs of producing clarity ex
post will be faced by others. A law-making body that does not en-
force law can “export” the costs of rulelessness to those who must
enforce whatever provisions have been enacted. There may be politi-
cal and other advantages in doing this—though as we have seen,
there are countervailing pressures too.
The odd and perhaps counterintuitive result is that a system of
separated powers imposes at least some pressure toward avoiding
rules. A system of unified powers does not impose similar pressure,
since in such a system people who refuse to make rules ex ante will
face the costs of rulelessness ex post. The rise of administrative
agencies combining traditionally separated powers helps counteract
the difficulty.
As I have said, the benefits for law-makers of refusing to make
rules may, in a system of separated powers, be countered by other
factors. The failure to make rules may be punished by the interests
that fear the outcomes within another branch of government; or it
may fit poorly with the representatives’ own political commitment
or electoral self-interest. Similar considerations apply to a decentral-
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ized, hierarchical judiciary. In such a system, there will be some in-
centive for the Supreme Court to avoid making rules and to export
the costs of rulelessness to others. But the incentive can be overcome
by other considerations. I return to these points below.
B. Notes on England and America
Some of these speculations are borne out by comparing the legal
system in England with that in the United States.41 English law is
far more rule-bound than American law. The Parliament is less
likely to delegate discretionary authority to judges. For their part,
English judges treat statutes as rules, interpreting them literally and
generally refusing to investigate whether the particular application of
the rule makes sense as a matter of policy or principle. In England,
law-making and law-interpretation are far more rule-bound than in
the United States, where law-making often takes place in the pro-
cess of confrontation with particular cases.
How might this be explained? It is notable that laws in England
are drafted by an Office of Parliamentary Counsel, a highly profes-
sional body that consists of skilled authors of laws. The
Parliamentary Counsel brings about a uniform style of drafting. It is
also closely attuned to the methods of English judges, and the
Counsel drafts legislation with close knowledge of literalism and of
the prevailing canons of construction. The judges’ practice is itself
uniform and relatively simple. In a parliamentary system, the gov-
ernment and the legislature are allied, and the high degree of party
control means that there is a level of homogeneity in England at the
law-making stage. Moreover, and critically, Parliament revisits
statutes with some frequency, and it fixes mistakes that are shown as
such when particular cases arise.
The situation in the United States is very different. There is no
centralized drafting body, and hence no uniformity in terminology,
and little professionalization. In America, the drafters of legislation
are multiple and uncoordinated. The party system has largely disin-
tegrated, and the executive and legislature are hardly aligned.
Congress appears only intermittently aware of the judges’ interpre-
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tive practices, which are themselves not easy to describe in light of
the sheer size of the federal judiciary and the existence of sharp splits,
on just this point, in the Supreme Court. Congress does overrule
statutory decisions to which it objects. But it is not in the business of
responding rapidly and regularly to particular cases in which literal
interpretations misfire. Hence both law-making and law-interpret-
ing practice are very different from what they are in England.
This brief description connects well with the contextual sugges-
tions offered above. There tends to be more dissensus in America
than in England at the law-making stage. The quality of drafting ex
ante is lower, as is the possibility of legislative correction ex post.
None of this suggests that England or America has the optimal level
of rules in light of its own institutional characteristics. But it does
suggest that the two legal systems are highly responsive to distinctive
contextual features.
IX. Reform Strategies
How can a legal system minimize the problems posed by unrea-
sonable generality on the one hand and those of potentially abusive
discretion on the other? The best approaches involve (a) highly
contextualized inquiries into the likelihood of error and abuse with
either rules or rulelessness, and hence an “on balance” judgment
about risk; and (b) a presumption in favor of a particular kind of rule,
that is, the privately adaptable rule that allocates initial entitlements
and does not specify outcomes. But there are other possibilities as
well.
A. Bentham and Acoustic Separation
Jeremy Bentham favored clear rules, laid down in advance and
broadly communicated. In at least some of his writings, he also fa-
vored adjudicative flexibility, allowing judges to adapt the rules to the
complexities of individual cases. Bentham was aware that rules could
misfire as they encountered particular controversies, especially if we
understand the notion of misfiring in utilitarian terms. In courts of
law, he concluded, the rules would not be fully binding. This sug-
gests a paradox: How could someone advocate clear rules without
asking judges to follow them? Bentham’s ingenious answer involved
the different audiences for law. The public would hear general rules;
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the judges would hear individual cases.42 This is the important idea
of an “acoustic separation” for legal terms, justified on utilitarian
grounds. There is such a separation in many areas of law, including
tax law and the law relating to excuses for criminality.
Following this idea, we might suggest that legislatures should lay
down rules, but that interpreters should feel free to ignore them in
contexts where they produce absurdity. In some ways this is the
American legal practice. Of course it is equally important to develop
subsidiary principles to discipline the general idea of “absurdity” and
to give it concrete application in the modern regulatory state.
Modern agencies, more than courts, might be entrusted with the
job of adapting general rules to particular circumstances.
There are, however, two large difficulties with the Benthamite
strategy. The first involves the right to democratic publicity—more
particularly, the right to know what the law is. The Benthamite
strategy appears to compromise that right. The rule of law and
democratic values might well be jeopardized if the law is not what
the statute books say that it is. Benthamite approaches might
therefore be unacceptable to the extent that utilitarian judgments
about acoustic separation run into liberal principles of publicity.
The second problem with the Benthamite strategy is that the
strategy fails to take account of the fact that general rules can be un-
acceptable precisely because general rules can create bad private in-
centives as compared with more fine-grained approaches. The se-
crecy of the Benthamite approach—the distinction between the law
as it is known and the law as it operates in courts of law—will do
nothing at all about the problem of poor incentives from crude rules.
Indeed, publicizing the exceptions, and telling everyone about the
possibility of close judicial attention to the particulars of your case,
may well be a good idea if we seek optimal incentives. At least this is
so if people would not react to the presence of exceptions by believ-
ing that they can do whatever they want and that the rule does not
exist at all.
We might conclude that too often, the Benthamite strategy is
neither democratic nor efficient. But there is still a place for a ver-
sion of it. A legal system might sometimes provide that in
exceptional cases, interpreters should be permitted to change rules,
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by exploring whether their justifications create absurdity or injustice,
if the particulars of the case so suggest. We might even see a judicial
(or administrative) power of this kind as part of the interpretation of
rules, not as an authority to change rules. This power should be
publicly known—a fully disclosed aspect of interpretation. In some
contexts, of course, the possibility of changing rules, or of
interpreting them with close reference to whether they make sense
in particular circumstances, might be too damaging to the project of
having rules. But this contextual judgment cannot be made in the
abstract.
B. Pragmatic Judgments
Often a legal system should make the choice between rules and
rulelessness on the basis of a contextual inquiry into the aggregate
level of likely errors and abuses. I have suggested that when judges or
other interpreters are perceived to be ignorant, corrupt, or biased, or
in any case when they diverge in their judgments from the people
who make rules, a legal system will proceed with rules. Even a poor
fit, in the form of over- and under-inclusive rules, can be tolerated
when individual decisions will be inaccurate as well. Thus we might
find factors when there is no special reason to distrust those who
will assess them. So too, individualized decisions are likely to be dis-
pensed with when it is possible to come up with rules that fit well.
The choice between rules and rulelessness might be seen as pre-
senting a principal-agent problem. The legislature, as the principal,
seeks to control the decisions of its agents. A problem with rules is
that the agents might be able to track the principal’s wishes better or
best if they are given the freedom to take account of individual cir-
cumstances. Any rule might inadequately capture the legislature’s
considered judgments about particular cases. The costs of rulelessness
might be acceptable if the legislature does not believe that the court
or other interpreter is likely to be untrustworthy, perhaps because
there is a basically shared view of relevant problems.
On the other hand, without rules the agent might become un-
controllable. This is so especially in light of the fact that a system of
factors allows the agent to weigh each factor as he chooses. The
result is that a system of rules might be adopted as the best way,
overall, to control the agent’s discretion, at least if there is a measure
of distrust of some or all agents.
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It is also true that rules tend to make sense and to be adopted in
the face of social consensus within the lawmaking body; decisions by
factors are more probable when there is dissensus. It is not hard to
obtain a ban on racial discrimination when people agree that this
form of discrimination is illegitimate; it is much harder to obtain a
similar ban on discrimination against the handicapped, where bal-
ancing tests are pervasive. Consider the fact that Congress often del-
egates discretionary power to an agency when it is unable to agree
on the appropriate rule, because of social dissensus, and therefore it
tells the agency to act “reasonably.” Examples include the areas of
broadcasting regulation and occupational safety and health. This
route is followed partly because factors, more conspicuously and
regularly than rules, drive discretion underground. The costs of lay-
ing down rules are increased in the face of dissensus on their con-
tent, and this consideration increases the likelihood that we will see
factors instead.
Sometimes it is impossible to come up with rules in a multi-
member body. Often participants in a dispute begin discussion by
attempting agreement on “principles” rather than concrete rules, as
in controversies over the Middle East. So too people are able to agree
on a set of relevant factors, or perhaps on some particular outcomes,
without being able to agree on a rule, or on the general reasons that
account for particular outcomes. Sometimes people agree on general
principles but disagree on particular cases. Sometimes the opposite is
true. When rules do not emerge from legislatures, it may well be be-
cause it is impossible to get agreement from a heterogeneous body.
Return here to the fact that legislatures that delegate broad discre-
tion can internalize two large benefits of rulelessness: economizing
on information costs and on the political costs of specificity. They
can simultaneously externalize the costs of rulelessness, which are
faced by administrators. It is administrators who must compile rele-
vant information and face the political heat of making hard and
specific choices.
It follows that we tend to find rules where one group of interests
is well-organized or otherwise powerful, and when its adversaries are
not. In circumstances of this sort, the well-organized interests can
press the governmental body in the direction of rules. A well-
organized group is unlikely to allow itself to become at risk through
factors when it need not do so (unless, perhaps, it believes that it is
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even more likely to be successful with bureaucrats or judges).
Consider laws governing the regulation of agriculture, which are
often highly specific, in part because the farmers’ lobby is well-
organized, and because the opponents of such laws are not.
Factors are more likely to be the basis for decision when oppos-
ing interests have roughly equivalent power in the lawmaking body,
and when they are willing to take their chances with a bureaucracy
or a judge. This may be so because they are both highly organized, or
because they are both weak and diffuse. A possible example is the
Occupational Safety and Health Act, which is quite vague, in part
because its opponents and adversaries are both powerful. On the
other hand, two well-organized groups might produce rules when
compromise is possible and when there are, to both groups, special
risks from relying on an agency or a court.
This may be the case when, for example, the regulated class
needs to know what the rule is, so that it can plan its affairs.
Perhaps it is better to have fairly bad rules than no rules at all. When
such planning is made possible by clear rules, members of the regu-
lated class may have it within their power to avoid (some of) the
costs of inaccurate rules. Perhaps they can alter their conduct so as to
avoid triggering the rule in cases in which the rule is over-inclusive.
On the other hand, this avoidance may itself be an undesirable social
cost. Return to the problem of site-level unreasonableness, where
application of an overbroad rule forces employers to make workplace
changes that produce possibly little gain, and at possibly high cost.
Rules are also more likely to be unacceptable when the costs of
error in particular cases are very high. The enormous danger of error
can make the over- and under-inclusiveness of rules intolerable. It is
one thing to have a flat rule that people under the age of 16 cannot
drive; the costs of the rule—mistaken denials of a license—are rela-
tively low. It is quite another thing to have a flat rule that people
falling in a certain class will be put to death. It is for this reason that
rule-bound decisions are unacceptable in inflicting capital punish-
ment, and to some extent in criminal sentencing generally. (But
here we must believe not only that rules make for error, but also that
case-by-case decisions will make for less error.)
The point also helps explain the dramatic difference between
criminal liability, which is generally rule-bound, and criminal sen-
tencing, which is generally based on factors. Part of the story is that
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specificity is needed at the liability stage, so that people can plan ac-
cordingly, and so that the discretion of the police is sharply cabined.
Both interests are far weaker at the sentencing stage. Planning is
not so insistently at stake. The discretion of the sentencing judge or
jury is less prone to abuse than the discretion of the police officer.
I have noted that rules are less acceptable in the face of sharp
limits in information and experience. When information is lacking,
or can be obtained only at high cost, officials will avoid them. At the
same time, rules—once they are in place—economize on informa-
tion costs at the point of application. For example, there was a dra-
matic shift from adjudication to rulemaking in American adminis-
trative agencies in the 1960s and 1970s, partly on the theory that
rules could resolve many cases at once, and limit the informational
costs, biases, and errors of case-by-case judgments. But because of
the informational demands faced by people who make rules in the
first instance, rules are now exceptionally difficult to promulgate,
and there has been a shift in the other direction, toward decision
without rules. In the Environmental Protection Agency, for exam-
ple, it takes over a year and a half to prepare a rule internally; half a
year more to receive the legally-required public comments; and six-
teen more months to analyze the comments and issue the rules.43 It
is not at all surprising that the result is to shift agencies away from
rulemaking and toward less costly options.
Rules are also less acceptable when circumstances are changing
rapidly. When circumstances are changing, rules are likely to be in-
accurate. Consider, for example, a congressional decision to issue a
statutory standard for permissible emissions levels for coal-fired
power plants. Surely any such standard will be out of date in a short
time because of technological change. In these circumstances rules
will become obsolete very quickly, and it may be best to delegate
decisions to institutions capable of changing them rapidly, or per-
haps to allow case-by-case judgments based on relevant factors.
When numerous decisions of the same general class must be
made, the inaccuracy of rules becomes far more tolerable. Consider,
for example, the requirement that all drivers must be over the age of
16, or the use of the social security grid to decide disability claims.
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Frustrating bureaucratic insistence on “the technicalities” may result
simply because so many decisions must be made, and because indi-
vidualized inquiry into whether technicalities make sense in particu-
lar cases is too time-consuming. Similarly, rules can be avoided when
few decisions need to be made, or when each case effectively stands
on its own.
There is a general conclusion. The choice between rules and
rulelessness cannot itself be made on the basis of rules. That choice
is itself a function of factors. It would be obtuse to say that one or
another usually makes sense, or is justified in most settings. To de-
cide between them, we need to know a great deal about the con-
text—the likelihood of bias, the location and nature of social dis-
sensus, the stakes, the risk of over-inclusiveness, the quality of those
who apply the law, the alignment or nonalignment of views be-
tween lawmakers and others, the sheer number of cases. It follows
that a well-functioning legal system should be suspicious of two
trends in recent writing—extravagant enthusiasm for rules and ex-
cessive focus on the possibility of achieving accurate outcomes
through fine-grained encounters with particulars.
C. Privately Adaptable Rules
A more ambitious strategy might emerge from distinguishing
between two sorts of rules.44 Some rules allocate initial entitle-
ments—they unquestionably count as rules—but at the same time
they maximize flexibility and minimize the informational burden on
government, by allowing private adaptation to determine ultimate
outcomes. Consider the rules of the road; taxes imposed on danger-
ous workplaces; rules allocating property rights and thus creating
private property; or rules governing entry into agreements. These
might be described as privately adaptable rules. By contrast, some
laws do not merely allocate entitlements, but also minimize private
flexibility by mandating particular end-states or outcomes. Consider
price controls, or specified technology for new cars, or flat bans on
the presence of carcinogens in the workplace. Rules that specify
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end-states are common in modern regulation, in the form of
“command and control” regulation that says exactly what people
must do and how they must do it.
The line between these sorts of laws is one of degree rather than
one of kind. What I am describing is a characteristic of some rules,
not a crisp category of rules. Notably, all rules allocate entitlements,
and the allocation may well have an effect on both preferences and
distributions, and hence on end-states as well.45 It is insufficiently
appreciated that government cannot avoid the task of allocating
entitlements and of doing so through rules. Laissez-faire is a
chimera; what is familiarly described as laissez-faire is actually a par-
ticular set of legal rules. Our rights, as we live them, do not come
from nature. They depend on law.46
We own property only because the legal system has allocated
property rights to us. In this sense, property rights are anything but
natural. Freedom of contract, as we understand and enjoy it, is not
part of nature. It is a function of legal rules creating and constituting
that form of freedom.47 The rules of private property and freedom
of contract are rules, and they are legal in character. What I want to
emphasize here is that these rules are distinctive in the sense that
they allocate initial entitlements, allow private adaptation, and do
not specify end-states.
Most generally, freedom to act is itself in important part a func-
tion of the legal system, which says, often, that people can do as
they wish without public or private interference, and with public or
private protection. If all this is right, there can be no system of
laissez-faire (short of anarchy); legal rules are pervasive and
inevitable, indeed coercive in their own way, even in the most
                                                                                                               
45Hence the Coase theorem will sometimes be wrong insofar as it predicts
the initial allocation of the entitlement will not affect outcomes. See Cass R.
Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J Legal Stud 217
(1993).
46See the instructive discussion of how cooperation must precede compe-
tition in Jules Coleman, Risks and Wrongs 60-62 (1992). This was a important
theme in the New Deal era. For general discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, The
Partial Constitution ch. 2 (1993).
47Some qualifications emerge from Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law
(1992).
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market-oriented of free market systems.48 (People in Eastern
Europe, now undertaking the difficult task of creating markets, have
seen this all too well.) Government can hardly avoid the task of
creating rules allocating rights.
The claim on behalf of privately adaptable rules is not that lais-
sez-faire is a possibility for law. It is instead that law can choose rules
with certain characteristics—rules that will reduce the risks of rules,
by allowing private adaptation and by harnessing market and private
forces in such a way as to minimize the informational and political
burden imposed on government. The ultimate project, then, is to
favor rules that specify and allocate initial entitlements, and to disfa-
vor rules that specify outcomes. Hence the rules that constitute mar-
kets are entirely acceptable insofar as their rule-ness usually does not
produce the risks that tend to accompany rules.
A key feature of privately adaptable rules is their association with
free alienability of rights. Ownership rights are of course freely
alienable,49 and in this way they attend to the fact that owners (and
purchasers) know how valuable the relevant rights are to them. The
informational burden on government is therefore minimized. The
surrounding rules do not operate as personal orders. They allow large
room for individual maneuver. They are coercive, to be sure. The law
of property is itself coercive insofar as it prevents non-owners from
claiming what they would otherwise claim and doing what they
would otherwise do.50 The virtue of privately adaptable rules is not
that they are not coercive and not that they are “natural”; it is that
                                                                                                               
48See Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 38-39 (1944): “The func-
tioning of a competition . . . depends, above all, on the existence of an appro-
priate legal system. . . . In no system that could be rationally defended would
the state just do nothing. An effective competitive system needs an intelligently
designed and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other.” See
also Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines 165-66 (1983): “Finally, the focus on
entitlement has the effect of emphasizing legal rights. Other relevant factors,
for example market forces, can be seen as operating through a system of legal
relations (ownership rights, contractual obligations, legal exchanges, etc.). The
law stands between food availability and food entitlement. Starvation deaths can
reflect legality with a vengeance.”
49To be sure, restrictions on free alienability might be justified for many
reasons, including collective action problems, externalities, difficulties with
commodification, and so forth. I cannot discuss these issues here.
50Cf. Sen, supra note 48.
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they reduce the costs of rule-making and harness private informa-
tion and preferences51 in the service of outcomes that are themselves
not identified ex ante.
People who favor privately adaptable rules, and who distrust rules
that specify end-states, are often known as critics of the modern
regulatory state.52 The distinction between the two sorts of rules
might easily be harnessed in the service of an argument for private
property, freedom of contract, simple rules of tort law, and relatively
little else. The same insights might, however, be used on behalf of
reform strategies that take the modern state as an important social
good. Many current regulatory rules are dysfunctional not because
they promote the goals of the modern regulatory state, but because
they unnecessarily specify end-states. In so doing, they produce both
injustice and inefficiency, in the form of over-inclusiveness and un-
der-inclusiveness, replicating all of the problems typically associated
with a refusal to make inquiries at the point of application.
A prominent example is command and control regulation, per-
vasive in the law of environmental protection; this form of regula-
tion has been largely unsuccessful because of the pathologies of rules.
It makes no sense to say that all industries must adopt the same
control technology, regardless of the costs and benefits of adoption
in the particular case. Command-and-control should be replaced by
more flexible, incentive-based strategies, which could use privately
adaptable rules. Instead of saying, for example, what technologies
companies must use, the law might impose pollution taxes or fees,
and then allow private judgments about the best means of achieving
desirable social goals. Government might also allow companies to
buy and sell pollution licenses, a system that would create good in-
centives for pollution reduction without imposing on government
the significant informational burden of specifying means of pollu-
tion reduction. The familiar economic argument for incentives is a
key part of the argument for privately adaptable rules.
Or consider the area of telecommunications, an area that has for
too long been burdened by unduly rigid rules. For much of its his-
tory, the Federal Communications Commission has been faced with
                                                                                                               
51Subject to the qualification in supra note 45.
52See Hayek, supra note 44; Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex
World (forthcoming 1995).
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the task of deciding to whom to allocate licenses. In making this
decision, it has alternated between rules and factors. In using factors,
the fcc has referred to local ownership, minority ownership,
participation by owners in public affairs, broadcast experience, the
adequacy of technical facilities, the background and qualifications of
staff, the character of owners, and more. The problems with both
rules and factors are entirely predictable—inaccuracy through exces-
sive rigidity on the one hand, and discretionary, ad hoc, costly, po-
tentially abusive judgments on the other. It is no wonder that both
approaches have largely failed.
What alternatives are possible? In a famous early article, Ronald
Coase argued that the government should allocate broadcasting li-
censes through what I am calling privately adaptable rules53— based
on property rights and market transfers, as we do (for example) for
ownership of newspapers and automobiles. In the last year the fcc
has experimented with auctions, and the experiments have produced
surprisingly good results. Now there is an obvious objection to
Coase’s proposal. Perhaps broadcasting licenses should not be re-
garded as ordinary property; perhaps the criterion of private willing-
ness to pay is an inadequate basis for awarding licenses. The objec-
tion contains a real point.54 Broadcasting protects a range of
“nonmarket” values, captured in the aspiration to promote attention
to public affairs, diversity of view, and high-quality programming.
But the objection is not a justification for departing from privately
adaptable rules in favor of command and control regulation via rules
or factors. Instead the rules for license auctions might be designed so
as to ensure auction credits for those applicants who promise to
promote nonmarket values. Th e example shows that privately
adaptable rules might well be used not to oppose regulatory goals,
but instead to harness market forces in the interest of those very
goals.
                                                                                                               
53See Ronald Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law
& Econ. 1 (1959).
54I try to support this view in Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the
Problem of Free Speech (1993).
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D. Abolition
Sometimes both rules and factors are intolerable; sometimes
market forces cannot or should not be harnessed. Having eliminated
both rules and factors, the law might use a lottery instead. (Of
course the decision to hold a lottery is supported by a rule.) This is a
characteristic approach to the military draft, where rule-bound
judgments seem too crude, and where judgments based on factors
are too obviously subject to discrimination and caprice. Lotteries are
used in many other areas as well. Of course lotteries have an arbi-
trariness of their own, and for this reason, they may be an inferior
approach.
Alternatively, the legal system, having found both rules and fac-
tors inadequate, might abolish the relevant institution itself. (The
abolition must of course be accomplished by rule.) Hence the best
argument for abolition of the death penalty takes the following
form. Rules are unacceptable because they eliminate the possibility of
adaptation to individual circumstances. Rule-bound death sentences
are excessively impersonal. But factors are unacceptable too, because
they allow excessive discretion, and create a risk that irrelevant or il-
legitimate considerations will enter the decision to impose capital
punishment. When judgments are to be made about who is to live
and who is to die, a high degree of accuracy is necessary, and errors
based on confusion, variable judgments, bias, or venality are intoler-
able. The problem is that human institutions cannot devise a system
for making capital decisions in a way that sufficiently diminishes the
risk of error. Rule-bound system create errors; so too with systems
based on factors.
The strongest argument against the death penalty is not that the
penalty of death is too brutal, but that it cannot be administered in a
sufficiently accurate way. Suppose it could be shown that through
individualized consideration in the form of factors, the rate of error
is high, at least in the sense that irrelevant or invidious factors play a
large role in the ultimate decision of life or death. Suppose that rules
are the only way to eliminate the role of such factors, but that rules
are objectionable in their own way, because they do not allow con-
sideration of possible mitigating factors. Perhaps evidence to this
effect would not be sufficient to convince most people that the
death penalty is unacceptable. But if it is possible to persuade a range
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of people of this conclusion, the sources of the argument lie, I think,
in evidence of this sort.
Conclusion
A system committed to the rule of law is committed to limiting
official discretion; but it is not committed to making every decision
according to judgments that have been fully specified in advance.
Nonetheless, rules are an admirable device for obtaining agreement
on the content of law, and also for reducing discretion at the point
of application. Often people can agree on rules when they disagree
about general theory; they can agree that the rules are binding, that
the rules are good, and that the rules have a certain identifiable
meaning. Frequently a lawmaker adopts rules because rules narrow
or even eliminate the range of disagreement and uncertainty faced
by people attempting to follow or to interpret the law. This step has
enormous virtues in terms of promoting predictability and planning
and of reducing both costs and risks of official abuse.
Rules are sometimes thought to be associated with merely formal
equality; but the association is misconceived. Hayekian understand-
ings of the rule of law, identifying rules with free markets, introduce
into that notion further ideas that should be distinguished and that
require an independent defense.
Rule-skeptics say that rules are not what they appear to be. In
their view, full ex ante specification of outcomes is a chimera. The
need for interpretation, during encounters with concrete cases,
means that ex post assessments of some sort are an inescapable part
of law. There is some truth in this claim. Almost any judgment
about meaning will partake of substantive ideas of a sort. It is almost
inevitable that some case can eventually arise that will confound the
attempt to use rules to specify all outcomes in advance. These claims
are chastening. But they do not defeat the project of those who are
enthusiastic about rules. Usually the question of meaning is easy;
often ex ante specification is possible for most cases. A form of rule-
following is therefore feasible.
Rules have many goals, but as they operate in law, they are often
simple summaries of good decisions in individual cases. In carrying
out this task, they reduce costs, ease choice, limit the errors encoun-
tered in particular decisions, produce coordination, and make it un-
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necessary to debate issues of value and fact every time someone does
something having social consequences. Because of their ex ante
character, rules will usually be over-inclusive and under-inclusive by
reference to the arguments that justify them. They will often be
outrun by changing circumstances. Usually the crudeness of rules is
tolerable, and most of the resulting inefficiency and injustice can be
controlled through means short of abandoning rules. But, some-
times the crudeness of rules counts decisively against them.
Some of the most difficult issues in law involve the choice be-
tween rules and factors in cases in which both seem
unacceptable—rules, because of their crudeness and their
insensitivity to particulars that confound them; factors, because of
the likelihood of arbitrariness and discrimination in application. The
Benthamite strategy calls for ex ante rules for the public and ex post,
case-by-case particularism for judges. I have questioned this strategy
on both economic and democratic grounds; but sometimes flexible,
contextual interpretation of rules, adapting the general to the
particular, can bring about something like the best of both worlds.
More generally, the choice between rules and rulelessness might
well be based on a highly pragmatic, contextualized inquiry into the
costs of the two approaches in the particular area at hand. Moreover,
privately adaptable rules are a promising effort to minimize the
problems of excessive generality, by opting for rules that harness
private ordering and thus reduce the informational costs imposed on
government. Some people who favor such rules intend their
arguments to be a critique of regulation and a basis for approval of
unrestricted (though rule-governed) free markets. But privately
adaptable rules may enjoy an important rebirth in the context of
government regulation—in the creation of rules that are designed to
accomplish regulatory goals, but that do so by specifying initial enti-
tlements rather than final outcomes, and that harness market forces
in the interest of socially chosen ends.
Rules and Rulelessness 67
This Working Paper is a preliminary version of an article that will
be published in 1996, The Tanner Lectures in Human Values.
Readers with comments should address them to:
Cass R. Sunstein
Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence
The Law School
The University of Chicago
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60637
Chicago Working Papers in Law and Economics
(Second Series)
1. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries
and Other Unpublished Works: An Economic Approach (July
1991).
2. Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T. J. Hooper: The Theory
and History of Custom in the Law of Tort (August 1991).
3. Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism (Septem-
ber 1991).
4. Richard A. Posner, Blackmail, Privacy, and Freedom of Con-
tract (February 1992).
5. Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior, and
Common Pools (February 1992).
6. Tomas J. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, Optimal Regulation
of aids (April 1992).
7. Douglas G. Baird, Revisiting Auctions in Chapter 11 (April
1992).
8. William M. Landes, Sequential versus Unitary Trials: An Eco-
nomic Analysis (July 1992).
9. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Influence of
Economics on Law: A Quantitative Study (August 1992).
10. Alan O. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law:
A Theoretical Survey With An Analysis of U.S. Policy
(September 1992).
11. Douglas G. Baird, 1992 Katz Lecture: Reconstructing Contracts
(November 1992).
12. Gary S. Becker, The Economic Way of Looking at Life (January
1993).
13. J. Mark Ramseyer, Credibly Committing to Efficiency Wages:
Cotton Spinning Cartels in Imperial Japan (March 1993).
14. Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law
(April 1993).
15. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?
(The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) (April 1993).
16. Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital
(August 1993).
17. J. Mark Ramseyer, Explicit Reasons for Implicit Contracts: The
Legal Logic to the Japanese Main Bank System (August 1993).
18. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Anticipatory Adjudication (September 1993).
19. Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law (September 1993).
20. Alan O. Sykes, An Introduction to Regression Analysis
(October 1993).
21. Richard A. Epstein, The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle
(March 1994).
22. Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game Theory and the
Law (June 1994).
23. William M. Landes, Counterclaims: An Economic Analysis
(June 1994).
24. J. Mark Ramseyer, The Market for Children: Evidence from
Early Modern Japan (August 1994).
25. Robert H. Gertner and Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement Escrows
(August 1994).
26. Kenneth W. Dam, Some Economic Considerations in the
Intellectual Property Protection of Software (August 1994).
27. Cass R. Sunstein, Rules and Rulelessness (October 1994).
